Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1987

The Effects of Depression on Expectancies and Perceptions of
Health Risk in Male Alcoholics
Margaret Kasimatis
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Kasimatis, Margaret, "The Effects of Depression on Expectancies and Perceptions of Health Risk in Male
Alcoholics" (1987). Dissertations. 2551.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/2551

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1987 Margaret Kasimatis

../
I (

THE EFFECTS OF DEPRESSION ON EXPECTANCIES
AND PERCEPTIONS OF HEALTH RISK IN MALE ALCOHOLICS

by
Margaret D. Kasimatis

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University of Chicago in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
December
1987

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

My deepest thanks to Joe Durlak, who was so generous
with his time and guidance in this project.

My thanks as well

to Dan Barnes and Tom Pallmeyer for their insight and assistance.

Deep appreciation goes also to Jim Hart and Bunny Zie-

bell, for providing tremendous-assistance with the data collection and analyses, and to my family (especially Greg), for
their unfailing patience across these last three years.

ii

Luck is when the guy next to you gets hit by the arrow.
Aristotle

iii

VITA

The author, Margaret Dorsher Kasimatis, is the daughter
of Robert Dorsher and Mary McGee Dorsher.
band, Steven, have one son, Gregory.

She and her hus-

Ms. Kasimatis was born

on May 18, 1957 in Park Ridge, Illinois.
After attending local public grammar schools, she completed her secondary education in 1975 at Marillac High School
in Northfield, Illinois.

In 1975 she was also named a

National Merit Scholar.
Ms. Kasimatis pursued a double major in psychology and
English at St. Mary's College in Notre Dame, Indiana.

As a

junior, she received the Kappa Gamma Pi National Award for
scholarship and service, and in her senior year she received
the English Departmental Award.

Ms. Kasimatis graduated magna

cum laude with a Bachelor of Arts degree in psychology and
English in May of 1979.
She entered Loyola University of Chicago and completed a
Master of Arts in clinical psychology in November of 1982.
Since her clinical internship at the V.A. Medical Center in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Ms. Kasimatis has worked as a clinical
research assistant at the V.A. and as a lecturer at Carroll
College and the University of Wisconsin.

She received the

degree of Doctor of Philosophy in November of 1987.
Ms. Kasimatis had a short story published in 1979 and a
iv

poem published in 1987.

She is second author of a study pre-

sented at a poster session of the 1986 Midwestern Psychological Association, which is scheduled to be published in 1988.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.
PREFACE.

....................................... ii

.............................................. .iii

VI TA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . ... . .. . . . . . . . iv

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. viii

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
CONTENT OF APPENDICES.

.ix

.................................. .x

INTRODUCTION . . • . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • • . . . • . • 1

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE.

•8

Health Risks Associated with Alcoholism.

.8

Perceptions of Health Risk Among Addicted Persons.

10

Self-Other Differences in Perceptions of Risk . . . . . . . 16
Rates of Depression and Suicide Among Alcoholics .... 21
The Role of Cognitions in Depression . . . . . . . . . .

.25

Death Attitudes and Life Threatening Behavior ....

.32

Other Correlates and Measures of Death Attitudes .... 35
Summary of Literature and Hypotheses ...

.41

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . .47
Subjects .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

METHOD ••.. , ..

. 49

Materials.

. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .60
RESULTS ..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 64
Analyses .

First Stage of the MRC .•

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .67
vi

Second Stage of the MRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Third Stage of the MRC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
DISCUSSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79

Correlates of the Self-Report Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
The Relevance of Depression ............ , ............ 84
Evaluations of Personal Risk . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Characteristic Cognitions of Alcoholics ............ 102
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
REFERENCES . . . • . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • . • . . • • . • • • . . . 118

APPENDIX A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
APPENDIX B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148

APPENDIX C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 5
APPENDIX D . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vii

I

••••••••••••••••••••

•

167

LIST OF TABLES

Page
1.

Distribution of BDI Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

2.

Between-Group ANOVAs on Independent Variables ....... 65

3.

Covariate Effects from the First Stage of the MRC ... 68

4.

Group Means for AEQ and Death Attitude Scales ....... 71

5.

Significant Main Effects and Interaction ....•.•..... 72

6.

Average Item-Whole Correlations of the AEQ ......... 162

7.

AEQ-Self Interscale Correlations .......•.•..•....•. 163

8.

AEQ-Other Interscale Correlations .................. 164

9.

Original and Revised AEQ Subscale Correlations ..... 165

10.

Revised AEQ Test-Retest Reliability Coefficients ... 166

viii

LIST OF FIGURES

Page
1.

Interaction of Depression by Alcoholic Group ...... , .. 77

2.

Interaction of Depression by Hypertensive Group ...... 78

ix

CONTENT OF APPENDICES

Page

. .......................... . .138

A.

Independent Variables.

B.

Dependent Variables.

. ............................ . .148

c.

Pilot Study . . . . . . . . .

. 155

D.

Test of Self-Other Differences.

.167

x

INTRODUCTION

Addictive behavior is self-destructive and potentially
lethal.

For that matter, a diagnosis of alcohol abuse or

dependence requires evidence of some type of alcohol-related
loss or impairment (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III,
1980).

Demographic studies show a very high incidence of

premature death among alcoholics, not only from secondary
diseases, but also from high rates of suicide, homicide,
falls, automobile fatalities, and deaths by fire (Combs-Orme
et al., 1983; Wilhelmsen, Elmfeldt, & Weder, 1983).

It is

estimated that almost 15% of our national health costs are
for alcoholism and alcohol-related disorders (Holden, 1987).
Why then do alcoholics, or other substance abusers, persist
in their

a~dictions?

Why, for instance, don't the poten-

tially adverse consequences of alcohol abuse more consistently deter further drinking?
The major aim of this study is to investigate these
issues by examining the role of cognitions in alcohol abuse
and dependence.

Specifically, beliefs regarding the conse-

quences of alcohol abuse were assessed in an outpatient
alcoholism treatment population.
two principle reasons.

Such research is apt for

First, there is currently little

information as to the importance of cognitions in the devel1
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opment and maintenance of alcoholism.

Secondly, the identi-

fication of specific cognitions associated with alcoholics'
drinking may prove useful in developing more effective
strategies for the treatment of alcoholism.
Regarding the first point, it is not clear how alcoholics evaluate the risk associated with their behavior.
Some theorists

vie~

alcohol abuse as a slow but systemmatic

form of suicide (Menninger, 1938).

Farbarow (1980) includes

addictions in the class of "indirect self-destructive behaviors,'' in which self-injury is not the primary, conscious
goal, but rather the by-product of behavior usually organized around a defense against depression.

Behaviorists try

to identify the specific contingencies that may either reinforce or punish alcohol abuse (Higgins, 1979).

Both social

learning and cognitive behavioral theories emphasize the
potentially reinforcing effects of the drinker's expectations and the often lenient consequences for impaired behavior (Lang et al., 1975; Lang, 1982; Rohsenow, 1983; Rohsenow & Bachorowski, 1984; Brown, 1985b).
Some studies suggest that addiction is associated with
a rather morbid orientation toward the future (Frederick,
Resnik, & Wittlin, 1973; Gertler, Ferneau, & Raynes, 1973).
Others show no direct relationship between substance abuse
and death attitudes or risk-taking behavior (Feifel & Nagy,
1980; Kumar, Vaidya, & Dwivedi, 1982).

Regarding the impor-

tance of cognitions for treatment planning, research has
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shown that expectations can significantly influence the use
of alcohol and, at relatively low levels of blood alcohol
concentration, beliefs regarding consumption can override
the physiological effects of the alcohol (Wilson,

1981).

As

a case in point, Gossop, Eiser, and Ward (1982) have emphasized the need for more information on the role of cognition
in drug dependence by demonstrating that the ways in which
addicts perceived their drug-taking are predictive of compliance in treatment.

Several investigators have specifi-

cally recommended that treatment be modified to address
alcoholics' particular perceptions and beliefs about their
drinking (Stafford, 1982; Cooney et al, 1987; Curry, Marlatt, & Gordon, 1987).
Treatment of alcoholism is frequently complicated by
the denial processes evidenced by many patients.

Denial,

whether viewed as a defense mechanism or an information
processing error, involves distorted cognitions.

Clini-

cally, it is manifested in a variety of ways: denial of the
need for treatment; denial of a cause and effect relationship between drinking and marital, occupational, or health
problems; denial of the magnitude of these problems; and
denial of the low self-esteem and high levels of anxiety and
depression characteristic of many alcoholics.

Anxiety and

depression could be considered appropriate responses to a
realistic appraisal of the risks associated with alcohol
abuse, assuming that alcoholics perceive their drinking and
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its consequences in a realistic light.

Unfortunately, there

is little knowledge of alcoholics' expectations of their
alcohol-related risk or harm.

Since alcoholics do not

represent a homogeneous group (Farbarow, 1980; Kline & Snyder, 1985; Holden, 1987), it seems unlikely that denial
processes could be reduced to a single belief or expectation.

However, distinguishing subgroups of alcoholics, on

the basis of some of the cognitions that support their
drinking, could prove helpful in understanding the psychology of alcoholism and developing more effective treatment
programs.

A review of the literature shows support for at

least two fairly divergent cognitions that may underlie
alcohol abuse.
One possibility is that some alcoholics believe that
they personally will not be harmed by continued drinking.
While they may acknowledge the risks associated with alcoholism in general, they do not internalize the possible consequences for themselves.

Research in the area of beha-

vioral medecine suggests that there is a general tendency
for people to see themselves as less vulnerable to health
risks than their peers, and this perceptual bias may be even
more pronounced among addicted populations.

For example, a

number of studies have shown that smokers, heavy social
drinkers, drunk drivers, and alcoholics tend not to internalize the effects of their substance abuse on their own
bodies (Fishbein, 1977; Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 1977; Selzer &
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Barton, 1977; Rohsenow, 1983; Gabrielli & Plomin, 1985).
Furthermore, researchers have noted that both smokers and
social drinkers consistently anticipate significantly more
positive than negative consequences of their drinking
(Southwick et al., 1981; Eiser & Harding, 1983; Rohsenow &
Bachorowski, 1984; Brown, Creamer, & Stetson, 1987).
A second distinct possibility is that some alcoholics
accurately perceive their alcohol-related risks but are
apathetic about these consequences.

Empirical literature

shows a high incidence of depressive and suicidal ideation
among alcoholics (Weissman et al., 1977; Murphy et al.,
1979; Bascue & Epstein, 1980; Steer, McElroy, & Beck, 1983).
There is evidence as well that depressed individuals process
information about themselves differently from more general
information: that is, that they perceive themselves and
their own futures more negatively than do nondepressed individuals (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Lewinsohn, Larsen, & Munoz, 1982; Bradley, 1983; Layne, 1983;
Segal & Shaw, 1986).

Thus a pessimistic or morbid orienta-

tion toward one's own future may characterize the cognitions
underlying the drinking of more depressed alcoholics.
The above findings suggest the possibility of a significant difference in the types of health expectations held
by depressed and nondepressed alcoholics.

Considering the

self-destructive quality of their behavior, alcoholics who
are not depressed need to engage in a more extreme form of
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cognitive distortion in order to maintain a "normal" positive bias regarding their own futures.

Conversely, more

depressed alcoholics are likely to be much more realistic in
their assessment of the risks associated with their continued drinking.

Thus one manifestation of depression in alco-

holies may be in the development of more negative but realistic assessments of their future health risks.
The present study sought support for the hypothesis
that perceptions of personal susceptibility to health risks
would vary with the severity of the alcoholic's depression.
Two samples of male alcoholics in outpatient treatment were
compared with outpatient male hypertension patients.

The

groups were comparable in terms of socioeconomic status,
education, and race.

It was hypothesized that in all groups

subjects with little or no depression would show a positive
bias in their expectancies, and that the less depressed
alcoholics' bias would be significantly more extreme than
that of the less depressed medical controls.

Conversely,

more depressed subjects were expected to be negatively
biased in their expectations for themselves, with the more
depressed alcoholics' bias again being more extreme than
that of the more depressed medical controls.

These effects

were expected to hold true for both general expectations of
personal health risk as well as for risks associated specifically with alcoholism, but not for less personalized views
of the general risks associated with alcohol abuse.
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Considering the most extreme consequences of self-destructi ve behavior, reactions to personal death were also hypothesized to relate to these biases, whereas reactions to the
deaths of others were not.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Research clearly documents the health risks associated
with alcoholism, as well as the high incidence of depressive
and suicidal ideation among alcoholics.

However, studies of

the perception of health risks among alcohol abusers, smokers, and narcotic addicts yield less clear-cut results.
While minimizing one's own susceptibility to health risks
may to some degree be considered normal, addicted persons
appear to distort their perceived risks to a more extreme
degree.

Studies of perceived personal risk in depressed

subjects suggest that, conversely, depressed persons do not
minimize their chances of misfortune: rather, they are apt
to appraise their futures more realistically and somewhat
more negatively.

Few studies have examined how perceptions

of personal health risk may relate to the risk-taking behavior and death attitudes of alcoholics, although again evaluations of personal death have been shown to be distinct
from evaluations of more general reminders of death among
undergraduate subjects.

I. Health Risks Associated with Alcoholism

Several large population studies have documented the

8
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health risks of alcoholics.

Wilhelmsen, Elmfeldt, and Wedel

(1983) examined the cause of death in over 300 Swedish males
between the ages of thirty-five and forty-four.

A random

sample of over 900 survivors in the same age range was used
as a control group for comparison purposes.

It was found

that subjects with a history of alcoholism or being arrested
for drunkenness had a higher rate of premature death, including significantly higher rates of suicide, heart disease,
cirrhosis, and accidents.

The authors noted, however, that

smoking and psychosocial problems were potential confounds.
Combs-Orme, Taylor, Scott, and Holmes (1983) traced
the mortality of alcoholics six to nine years post-treatment, comparing a sample of almost 1300 alcoholics from four
sites with local actuarial rates.

They found that 22% of

their sample was dead: of these, 18% had suffered violent
deaths. This mortality rate was more than three times that
of the local actuarial rates when adjusted for age, sex, and
race.

The group showed significantly higher rates of fatal

suicide attempts, burns, falls, and pedestrian and automobile accidents.

The authors concluded that the risk was

associated with both the pharmacological effects of drinking and the alcoholic lifestyle.
et al.

More recently, Rychtarik

(1987) reported a 15% mortality rate five to six

years post-treatment for chronic alcoholic subjects.
Nuttall, Evenson, and Cho (1980) examined the psychiatric histories of 1700 suicides in Missouri between 1972 and
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1974.

They found that 20% had had a previous diagnosis of

alcoholism.

Motto (1980) followed 978 subjects who had been

diagnosed as suicidal alcohol abusers and reported that 5.5%
of these subjects had committed suicide within two years.
Farbarow (1980) estimated the alcoholic suicide attempt rate
to be 25%, with 10% succeeding, as opposed to the approximately 1% of deaths by suicide in the general population
(Combs-Orme et al., 1983).

He also cited the American Medi-

cal Association's estimate that the life expectancy of alcoholics was 12 years less than that of nonalcoholics, due in
part to high rates of cirrhosis, pancreatitus, and CNS dysfunction.

Thus there is substantial evidence of heightened

health and mortality risks among alcoholics.

II. Perceptions of Health Risks Among Addicted Persons

Data suggest that addicted subjects, such as smokers
and alcoholics, do not accurately perceive their high-risk
status.

Schwebal and Kaemmerer (1977) showed that smoking

students showed significantly more "alienation from body"
than did nonsmoker and ex-smoker controls, i.e. a lack of
internalization of the effects of smoking on their own
bodies.

Eiser and Harding (1983) found that smoking and

nonsmoking college students in Great Britain differed significantly in their perceptions of the perceived benefits
and risks of smoking cigarettes and marijuana, and the per-
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ceived benefits of drinking alcohol.

They also compared

users and nonusers of seatbelts, finding that nonusers of
seatbelts were

si~nificantly

more skeptical of the value of

preventive behavior.
In a literature review of smokers' beliefs, Fishbein
(1977) differentiated three levels of acceptance of risk:
awareness, generalized acceptance, and personalized acceptance.

These levels reflect having information of risk,

accepting its validity, and accepting its significance for
oneself.

Fishbein (1977) found that almost half of the

smokers studied did not even have full generalized acceptance of risk, and concluded that logically even fewer would
have personalized the risk.

Similar results were reported

in Selzer et al.'s (1977) studies of alcoholics and drunk
drivers who, compared to controls, assessed their impaired
driving as significantly safer, even though they also
admitted to a significantly greater degree of specific
impaired driving behaviors.
More recently, Gabrielli and Plomin (1985), comparing
anticipated sensitivity to alcohol in pairs of twin and
adopted siblings, found no genetic basis for beliefs about
alcohol-induced impairment in thinking, mood, or driving
ability, although a belief of having less sensitivity to
alcohol was associated with a higher average number of
drinks per drinking session.

However, some studies

utilizing Zuckerman et al.'s (1964) Sensation Seeking Scale
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suggest that some drinkers' abuse of alcohol is associated
with a broader biological responsivity to many forms of
stimulation (Zuckerman, 1971; Galazio, Rosenthal, & Stein,
1983).

Similarly, Labouvie and McGee's (1986) longitudinal

data on alcohol and drug use in adolescence suggest that
heavier use is positively associated with risk-taking
attributes and negatively associated with cognitive
complexity and harm avoidance.
Brown et al.

(1980) explored the expectations of rein-

forcement from alcohol in over 400 social drinkers.

Their

responses to a ninety-item questionnaire yielded six independent expectancy factors: global positive experiences,
social/physical pleasure, enhanced sexual performance or
experience, increased power/aggression, increased social
assertiveness, and reduced tension.

Brown et al. (1980)

found that expectancies varied with drinking pattern: light
drinkers tended to have more global positive expectancies,
whereas heavier drinkers' expectations focused more specifically on enhanced sexual and aggressive behaviors.

This

same questionnaire was used by Brown, Goldman, and Christianson (1985) to demonstrate a significant positive correlation between the strength of alcohol-effect expectancies
and the amount of alcohol consumed for alcoholic, medical
patient, and student samples, a finding replicated by Brown
and Munson (1987).

Brown and Munson (1987) also found sup-

port for the hypothesis that personality factors may differ-
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entially influence motivation for alcohol use.

More extro-

verted students were found to expect significantly more
pleasure, relaxation, and feelings of power from drinking,
whereas more anxious students anticipated significantly more
global positive changes, social assertion, sexual enhancement, and feelings of power.

Brown (1985b) also reported

that alcohol expectancies increased the predictability of
college students' drinking patterns, and that alcohol expectancies differentially related to problemmatic and nonproblemmatic drinking.
Rohsenow (1983) modified Brown et al.'s (1980) questionnaire so as to measure additional expectations of negative consequences and to assess expectations for oneself
versus others.

Rohsenow (1983) found that subjects consis-

tently expected to be less affected by alcohol than others
would be.

Also, medium and heavy drinkers expected to

experience at least as many positive effects, but no more
negative effects than would light drinkers.

The author sug-

gested that positive expectations influence drinking behavior more than negative expectations, a conclusion shared by
Southwick et al.

(1981), who also found that students who

were heavy drinkers were more oriented toward the potential
positive effects of drinking.

Similar results were reported

by Brown, Creamer, and Stetson (1987) in their study of high
school drinkers.

Adolescent alcohol abusers expected signi-

ficantly more positive consequences from alcohol than did a

14
nonabusing comparison group, but did not differ in their
expectations of the negative consequences of deteriorated
cognitive/motor functioning.
Rohsenow and Bachorowski (1984) have also examined the
effects of alcohol and expectancies on verbal aggression.
In several studies, students were assigned to beverage
(alcohol and tonic or tonic alone) and beverage-expectancy
conditions and were subsequently provoked by an experimenter.

Rohsenow and Bachorowski (1984) found that for all

subjects at higher doses and males at lower doses, those who
believed that they had received alcohol were significantly
less aggressive than were subjects expecting only tonic.
The authors concluded that many of the reinforcements of
alcohol use were due to the effects of drinkers' cognitions
rather than the pharmacological effects of the alcohol.
Several recent studies suggest that the beliefs of the
drinker or smoker influence response to treatment.
et al.

Kaufert

(1986) examined the pre-existing health beliefs of

volunteer subjects randomly assigned to either hypnosis,
health education, behavior modification, or a control group
for smoking cessation.

Each treatment group showed a signi-

ficant reduction in cigarette consumption, but the response
to the health education group in particular could be predicted by initial views of perceived vulnerability and general
health concern, suggesting that pre-existing health beliefs
might influence responsiveness to a particular modality of
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treatment (Kaufert et al., 1986).
Eiser et al.

Along these same lines,

(1985) evaluated data from over 2300 respon-

dents to a television promotion to quit smoking, and found
that expectancy of success and perceived health benefit were
highly predictive of attempts to quit and success at one
year follow-up.
Cooney et al.

(1987) assessed cognitive and affective

changes in abstinent alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinkers
after exposure to an alcohol cue.

The authors found that

all subjects, after an alcohol cue exposure, experienced an
increased desire to drink, and anticipation of positive
effects and little impairment from drinking.

However, other

reactions associated only with alcoholic subjects included
increased physical symptoms and feelings of guilt, more
external attributions for the cause of the desire to drink,
and decreased confidence about maintaining abstinence.
These cognitive and affective changes were interpreted as
consistent with Marlatt's (1978) ''abstinence violation
effect," evidenced among smokers too, in which the awareness
of desire for a substance leads to feeling of guilt and
lessened self-efficacy, even if abstinence is maintained.
Cooney et al.

(1987) emphasized the importance of identify-

ing and modifying these responses for relapse prevention.
Additional support for the abstinence violation effect
("AVE") as a cognitive-behavioral model of the relapse process was recently reported by Curry, Marlatt, and Gordon
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(1987).

When AVE's were operationalized as internal, sta-

ble, and global attributions for a lapse in smoking cessation, they were the strongest predictor of relapse within
one year post-treatment. Curry, Marlatt, and Gordon (1987)
recommended the use of such cognitive-behavioral interventions as cognitive restructuring and role playing to reinforce attributional styles more supportive of regaining
abstinence after a lapse.

III. Self-Other Differences in Perceptions of Risk

It appears that most people evaluate their own attributes and behavior differently from the way in which they
evaluate others.

Some studies with college students suggest

that even on an information processing level there are differences in the way we perceive ourselves and others.

Kui-

per and Rogers (1979) looked at how students encoded data
about themselves and others, and found that different processes were used.

Subjects utilized a more efficient,

organized schema for self-relevant information, whereas
information about others required memory rehearsal and an
apparent comparison and contrast with oneself.

In examining

differences in attribution processes, Weary (1980) found
that students were more likely to make self-attributions for
successful outcomes, especially under high-publicity conditions.
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Hull, Young, and Jouriles (1986) have related patterns
of encoding self-relevant information to differences in
alcohol use and abuse.

In a set of studies with alcoholic

veterans and drinking adolescents, the authors reported
results highly consistent with the self-awareness model of
alcohol consumption: namely, that highly self-conscious
individuals drink to control sensitivity to positive and
negative self-relevant experiences.

In the first study,

highly self-conscious alcoholics experiencing negative selfrelevant events were significantly more likely to relapse
within three months post-treatment, whereas the drinking of
low self-conscious alcoholics was unrelated to the quality
of their experiences (accounting for 30% and 1% of the variance in alcoholic relapse, respectively).

In a second

study, Hull, Young, and Jouriles (1986) demonstrated that
high school students' drinking was influenced by different
psychological and social factors, depending upon the degree
of their self-consciousness.
This self-other difference in evaluation has also been
demonstrated in views of mortality and health risk.

Tolor

and Murphy (1967) reported that men significantly overestimated their own projected life span by an average of ten
years more than their estimates of life expectancy for other
men.

Neither anxiety nor experiences with death were signi-

ficantly correlated with this tendency to overestimate one's
own life expectancy.

Handel (1969), also investigating sub-
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jective life expectancy, concluded as well that men were
more defensive about their own deaths.

Perceived personal

invulnerability has also been demonstrated in relation to
risk of cancer, heart attack, pneumonia, alcoholism, vene. real disease, and divorce (Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).
Weinstein (1980, 1982, 1984) conducted a series of
studies of college students' perceptions of personal susceptibility to health and safety risks.

In his first study,

Weinstein (1980) had students rate the probability of experiencing various future life events relative to the probability for their peers.

The group means reflected a signifi-

cantly optimistic bias regarding one's own future: students
anticipated significantly more positive and fewer negative
events in their own futures than in their peers' futures.
Having the subjects list their reasons for their judgments
decreased but did not eliminate the bias for anticipated
positive events.

Incidentally, the anticipation of future

alcohol problems had the strongest positive bias of all.
Weinstein (1980) suggested that the results could be interpreted in either a motivational/defensive or cognitive
error/information processing framework, i.e. either as an
unconscious defense against depression or as an unrealistic
conclusion based on an illogical synthesis of information.
Weinstein (1982) then focused on expectations of
health and life-threatening behavior, and found that students showed a significant optimistic bias for their own
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future health on thirty-four out of forty-five potential
diseases or symptoms.

This bias correlated significantly

with perceived controllability, lack of previous experience
with the illness, and belief that risk ended with childhood.
Interest in preventive behavior was shown to correlate positively with the perceived likelihood of risk, the severity
of the risk, and the degree of worry associated with the
specific risk-- correlates similar to those reported in
Eiser and Harding's (1983) study of smokers and seatbelt
users.

An optimistic bias regarding risk, then, might

interfere with preventive behavior by lessening worry about
potential health risks (Weinstein, 1982).
In a more recent study, Weinstein (1984) examined the
basis of biased expectancies, and found that students were
unrealistically optimistic regarding their ability to lessen
their susceptibility by their own behavioral and psychological attributes.

Students evaluated risks associated with

heredity factors fairly realistically, and were somewhat
pessimistic regarding environmental factors.
holism rated among the lowest perceived risks.

Again, alcoAll correla-

tions between behavior and perceptions of susceptibility
were weak except for smoking, which may reflect the impact
of recent efforts to educate the public regarding the hazards of smoking.

Weinstein (1984) found that factors per-

ceived to increase risk carried more weight in judging personal risk than did the risk-decreasing factors, although
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fewer were cited as the bases for judgments, i.e. subjects
were generally more oriented toward factors that decreased
their risk of disease.

The author suggested self-esteem

enhancement as a motive.
Adapting Weinstein's methods, Perloff and Fetzer
(1986) had undergraduates evaluate their own risks and those
of either an average person, average student, close friend,
sibling, or parent, and found significant differences in
self-other comparisons under the two "average" conditions
but not with specific others as the comparison targets.

In

a second study, some students were assigned a comparison
target of either an average student or a close friend, while
a third group was free to select any friend for similar
self-other risk ratings.

Perloff and Fetzer (1986) found

significantly larger self-other differences for the "average" and "any friend" conditions, with the majority of the
subjects in the latter condition selecting people they perceived as particularly at risk.

Again, perception of future

drinking problems showed one of the strongest self-other
effects. The authors offered an ego-defensive downwardcomparisons interpretation, suggesting that when given the
opportunity, people will lessen their anxiety about the
possibility of negative experiences by focusing on others
perceived to be more at risk.
Thus, while the health risks associated with alcoholism are clearly documented, there are indications that many
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drinkers unrealistically minimize their personal risk of
harm.

Some studies of information processing suggest that

most people evaluate information about themselves differently from information about others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979;
Weary, 1980; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).

Weinstein's (1980,

1982, 1984) studies support these findings by demonstrating
that college students consistently underestimate their personal susceptibility to health risks.

Studies with drinkers

and smokers show a similar lack of acceptance of personal
risk (Fishbein, 1977; Schwebal -& Kaemmerer, 1977; Selzer et
al., 1977).

Several researchers have found heavy drinkers

to perceive others (as opposed to themselves) as more
affected by alcohol and more vulnerable to the negative
consequences of drinking (Brown et al., 1980; Southwick et
al., 1981; Rohsenow, 1983; Brown & Munson, 1987).

These

findings suggest that some alcoholics do not internalize the
health risks associated with continued drinking, and this
unrealistic appraisal of personal risk may interfere with
the development of more preventive and adaptive behavior.

IV. Rates of Depression and Suicide Among Alcoholics

There is a high incidence of depressive and suicidal
ideation among alcoholics.

Nakamura et al.

(1983) reported

25% of inpatient alcoholic veterans had moderate to marked
depression at intake, and this initial level of depression
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correlated with overall severity of abuse and a history of
addiction, sleep disturbance, and neurological or organic
symptoms.

Levels of depression generally decreased across
Behar, Winokur, & Berg (1984) looked

the time of treatment.

at levels of depression in abstinent alcoholics and found
that 16% reported debilitating depressive symptoms beginning
after a mean of 35 months of sobriety.

The depressed sub-

jects had a longer mean period of abstinance, and 46% had
experienced a social stress prior to onset of the depression.

Holden (1987) also reported that depression, as a

primary diagnosis among alcoholics, is associated with more
benefit from treatment.
Weissman et al.

(1977) found that 59% of outpatient

alcoholics sampled were diagnosed as having a secondary
depression, i.e. depression that followed or developed as a
complication of another diagnosed mental illness.

The

authors noted that the demographic backgrounds of alcoholics
with secondary depression differed little from the backgrounds of the nondepressed alcoholics, thus making the nondepressed alcoholics appropriate controls for studying the
unique effects of depression in this population.

They also

cited literature estimating the prevalence rates of secondary depression in alcoholism to range from 28% to 59%-more than double the 13% to 20% incidence rates of depression in the general population (Oliver & Simmons, 1984; Oliver & Simmons, 1985).
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Woodruff et al.

(1973b) also reported that alcohol

abuse preceded depression in over 90% of their sample of
depressed alcoholics.

Depressed alcoholics were found to be

more like nondepressed alcoholics than like primary depressives on a number of personality and socio-economic variables.

A significant sex difference was also observed:

there was a higher incidence of depression among female
alcoholics than male alcoholics.

However, Gibson and Becker

(1973a) found the cognitive organization of depression in
alcoholics to be highly similar to that of primary depressives.

Examining the factor structure of responses on the

Beck Depression Inventory, the authors noted that alcoholics
tend to have high depression scores that load on three factors comparable to the factors identified in a study of primary depressive subjects by Beck (1967).

The authors sug-

gested that this cognitive similarity reflects either a concommitant primary depression among many alcoholics or else
"transdiagnostic" factors that are not unique to depression.
A number of researchers have examined suicidal ideation and attempts among alcoholics.

Bascue and Bpstein

(1980) found that 67% of veterans in an inpatient alcoholism
treatment unit reported having seriously considered suicide,
and 25% reported having made suicide attempts in the past.
Beck, Steer, and McElroy (1982) studied the relationship
between hopelessness and suicidal ideation in alcoholic outpatients.

They found a mean Beck Depression Inventory score
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of 13.88 for the sample, indicating mild depression, and
found that hopelessness (as measured by Beck's Hopelessness
Scale) accounted for 42% of the variance of current suicidal
ideation.

Using the

s~me

sample, Steer, Beck, and McElroy

(1983) reported moderate to severe depression in 33.3% of
the subjects, with 27% reporting prior suicide attempts.
Level of depression was significantly correlated with a history of suicide attempts, severity of recent drinking, and
being white.

Beck, Weissman and Kovacs (1976) found hope-

lessness accounted for 16% of the variance of suicidal
intent in a sample of 378 suicide attempters, some of whom
were heavy drinkers.
Two other studies also utilized retrospective data to
help predict suicide among alcoholics.

Murphy et al. (1979)

replicated an earlier finding that roughly one third of suicides in an alcoholic sample were associated with a significant interpersonal loss within six weeks of the suicide.
They also reported that more than two thirds of the suicidal
subjects had had a definite or likely secondary depression,
but it was suicide and not depression that was related to
the experience of a recent significant loss.

And Berglund

(1984) followed over 1300 alcoholic subjects admitted to a
psychiatric unit across thirty-one years, and found 41% were
dead, with 14% of these deaths officially registered as suicide and 7% more cases of uncertain suicide.

Alcoholics who

had later committed suicide had higher rates of dysphoria,
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depressive symptoms, and peptic ulcers at admission,
although frequencies of cognitive impairment and delirium
tremens were similar to those of survivors.

Suicide risk

was 7% for the total sample, rising to 9% if depression or
dysphoria was present, and 18% if subjects had a history of
peptic ulcer.

Thus the alcoholic population is distinctly

more at risk for the problems of depression and suicide.

V. The Role of Cognitions in Depression

In recent years there has been extensive inquiry into
the significance of the cognitive patterns associated with
depression.

While some findings have proved equivocal, in

all there has been support for a number of the assertions of
cognitive models of depression, including: depressed subjects have less positive perceptions of and expectations for
themselves than do nondepressed subjects, and they show some
distinctive attributional styles that have implications for
reinforcing negative self-schema and weakening motivation to
cope with environmental stressors (Segal & Shaw, 1986;
Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey, 1986).
In a meta-analysis of 104 studies of attributional
styles in depression, Sweeney, Anderson, and Bailey (1986)
found several consistent patterns, independent of such
potential confounds as subject population or the measures
used.

Particularly in relation to experiences of negative
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events, depressed subjects showed strong tendencies toward
attributions of internal, stable, and to a lesser degree
global causes-- failures were perceived as a function of a
lack of ability.

Conversely, positive events were associ-

ated with depressive attributions of external, unstable, and
specific causes, such as luck.

These findings were highly

consistent with the leading cognitive theories of depression, i.e. Beck's cognitive theory and the reformulated
learned helplessness theory of depression.
Coyne and Gotlib's (1983) examination of the support
for these two cognitive theories was more critical, with an
overall conclusion that there was no strong empirical base
for one of the most important tenets, the causal role of
cognitions in depression.

Even so, the authors did find

support for the theory-based predictions that depressed
subjects present themselves more negatively, make more
internal attributions for negative experiences, are more
negative in recall of feedback, and are more negative but
possibly more realistic in self-evaluations.

In a recent

critique of Coyne and Gotlib's (1983) conclusions, Segal and
Shaw (1986) reiterated the significance of depressogenic
cognitions as part of the complex interaction of biochemical
and behavioral symptoms of depression, and the potential
value of identifying cognitive vulnerability markers that
contribute to the onset of depression.
Other literature reviews have also found support for
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the hypothesis that depressed subjects are more realistic
and less defensively biased in their appraisal of themselves
and their futures.

Layne (1983) concluded that depressed

subjects have more realistic expectancies, perceptions,
self-monitoring, memory, and attributions across a variety
of tasks and outcomes.

The author noted that nondepressed

persons may be less realistic but better adapted in terms of
maintaining motivation and the effects of self-fulfilling
prophecies.

Krantz's (1985) review suggested that the nega-

tive views characteristic of depression are in large part a
rational response to such realities as more negative life
experiences, social and interpersonal deficits, and more
negative appraisals by others. Krantz (1985) hypothesized
that at different stages of depression, the self-schema may
interact differently with the types of information available
from the environment.
Similarly, Alloy and Abramson (1979) found more distortion in nondepressed students' judgments of contingency.
In several experiments, depressed students were more negative yet more accurate in estimating the contingency between
their responses and subsequent positive or negative outcomes.

Nondepressed subjects were significantly more apt to

have an illusion of control, particularly associated with
positive outcomes.

In Lewinsohn et al.'s (1981) longitu-

dinal study of depressive cognitions, community volunteers
were assessed across an average interval of eight months for
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patterns of expectancies and beliefs.

The authors found

that cognitions at the first measurement

differenti~ted

the

depressed subjects from controls but did not predict subsequent depressive episodes.

Support was found for a positive

correlation between depression and negative expectations,
and a negative correlation between depression and positive
expectations.

Lewinsohn et al.

(1981) concluded that the

cognitions were concommitant to the experience of depression, but were not causal or stable patterns of negative
thinking.
Some studies support viewing the cognitive style of
depressives as distorted or irrational.

Eaves and Rush

(1984) examined cognitive patterns in depressed subjects and
found that they showed significantly more dysfunctional
attitudes than did matched controls, both when symptommatic
and in remission.

Depressed subjects also demonstrated sig-

nificantly more negative automatic thoughts and a different
attributional style vis a vis negative events, which led the
authors to conclude that negative views were characteristic
of depression, as predicted by cognitive theories of depression. Eaves and Rush (1984) emphasized the need to find evidence for the causal role of cognitions in depression, as
well as their role in other forms of psychopathology.
Kuiper and McCabe (1985) found that subjects who were
depressed or cognitively vulnerable to depression evaluated
negative topics as more appropriate for discussion than did
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nondepressed subjects.

The authors suggested that this dif-

ference in social judgment might

stimulat~

rejection and

reinforce the social isolation experjenced by many depressed
people.

Also, Cook and Peterson (1986) found depressed stu-

dents to endorse more self-deprecating beliefs and to offer
fewer logical and more illogical justifications for their
causal attributions.
There is also some evidence that depressed individuals
process information about themselves in a unique manner.
Bradley (1983) found support for a negative self-schema
model of depression by demonstrating that depressed subjects
recalled significantly more negative words in a self-referent condition only. Whereas nondepressed controls showed a
positive bias in self-referent words, depressed subjects
showed a positive bias only in an other-referent condition,
therefore not displaying a generalized negative bias.

In

other words, depressed subjects were less positive only in
relation to themselves.

Ingram (1984) reported that nega-

tive mood states led to a deeper processing of personally
relevant negative feedback.
Crocker, Kayne, and Alloy (1985) reported that
depressed and nondepressed students differed in self-other
comparisons particularly in terms of depression-relevant
items.

Nondepressed subjects seldom rated depressive items

as self-relevant, and when they did they were more apt to
"normalize" the items by rating them as true of others as
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well.

In contrast, depressed subjects did not show this

self-enhancement effect, instead endorsing more depressive
items as self-relevant, independent of ratings of others.
The results of these studies are all in accord with Kuiper
and Ross's (1979) assertion that people use different processes for encoding information about themselves than they
use for encoding information about others.
Consistent with these findings, Lewinsohn et al.
(1982) found partial support for Beck's cognitive triad of
depression, i.e. that negative views of the self, the world,
and the future lead to distortions of experience and subsequent symptoms of depression.

The authors reported that

self-referent items best discriminated between depressed
subjects and nondepressed controls.

Depressed subjects dem-

onstrated significantly more negative and fewer positive
expectations for themselves and their own futures, but not
for the present and future of the world at large.

Munoz and

Lewinsohn (unpublished manuscript) essentially replicated
these results with another sample of community volunteers.
Depressed subjects showed greater agreement with irrational
beliefs and greater negative expectancies for themselves, as
well as more frequent negative thoughts, less frequent positive thoughts, less emotional response to positive thoughts,
and more negative emotional reaction to self-related negative thoughts.

Self-related scales most differentiated

depressed subjects, and the authors concluded that a nega-
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tive view of oneself is unique to depression.

However, Mar-

tin, Ward, and Clark (1983) found that neuroticism, not
depression, was associated with selective attention to selfreferent negative information in female undergraduates.

And

Gibson and Becker's (1973a) report of the cognitive similarity between depressed alcoholics and primary depressives
does not support Munoz and Lewinsohn's (submitted for publication) suggestion that negative self-perceptions are unique
to depression.
A more recent set of studies by Pyszczynski, Holt and
Greenberg (1987) found strong support for Kuiper's negative
self-schema theory of depression.

After demonstrating that

depressed undergraduate subjects were significantly less
optimistic about their own futures, the authors manipulated
the degree of internal or external focus among subjects,
hypothesizing that a more internal focus (and accompanying
activation of self-schema) would intensify the degree of
bias among the depressed and nondepressed students.

Con-

sistent with this hypothesis, Pyszczynski, Holt, and Greenberg (1987) found externally focused depressed subjects to
be no more pessimistic than nondepressed subjects, whereas
internally focused depressed subjects maintained a distinct
pessimistic bias.

The authors concluded that an internal

focus stimulated use of self-schema as the reference for
evaluating oneself and others by comparison.
In summary, estimates of the prevalence of depression
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in alcoholics typically range from approximately 25% to 60%,
depending upon the method of assessment, with reported suicide attempts in 7% to 27% of the alcoholics sampled (Weissman et al., 1977; Steer, Beck, & McElroy, 1983; Hesselbrock
et al., 1983; Berglund, 1984).

While support is equivocal

concerning the hypothesized causal role of cognitions in
depression, there is evidence that depressed subjects are
characteristically less positive in their perceptions and
evaluations of themselves, as opposed to more global negative views (Segal & Shaw, 1986; Sweeney, Anderson, & Bailey,
1986; Eaves & Rush, 1984; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg,
1987).

Several researchers have concluded that depressed

individuals, while more negative, are more realistic in
their appraisals of themselves and their futures (Alloy &
Abramson, 1979; Layne, 1983; Krantz, 1985).

These studies

suggest that depressed alcoholics are apt to be more negative, but more realistic, in their perceptions of their
future health risks.

V. Death Attitudes and Life-Threatening Behavior

There are only a few studies of death attitudes in
addicted populations.

In research with alcoholic subjects,

no clear relationship has been found between the self-destructive behavior associated with alcoholism and the subjects' death attitudes.

Feifel and Nagy (1980) examined the
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relationship of death attitudes to both life-threatening and
risk-taking behavior in a sample of more than 600 male subjects.

Alcoholics, addicts, and prisoners were compared to

control groups of government employees and deputies for
death attitudes on several levels of consciousness.

Feifel

and Nagy (1980) found few significant differences in death
attitudes when they controlled for socioeconomic status,
verbal I.Q., and age.

All groups showed more fear of death

; .· ·5i
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on fantasy and unconscious levels; all groups were more
positive regarding life than death.

The control group

di{~

report significantly fewer suicidal thoughts or attempts.:

r;,;,

Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) found differences
between subtypes of alcoholics and their death anxiety,
measured by the Templer-McMordie scale.

Using Brown's

(1977) system for differentiating gamma (loss of control)
and delta (inability to abstain) alcoholic subgroups, plus a
control group of nondrinkers, the authors found that delta
alcoholics reported significantly more death anxiety than
controls, who in turn had significantly more death anxiety
than gamma alcoholics.

Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982)

concluded that there was a need to study multidimensional
personality and drinking patterns in alcoholics.
Other studies with smokers and heroin addicts suggest
evidence of some morbidity in attitudes.

Schwebal and Kaem-

merer (1977) noted that most smokers tend to be fatalistic
and to perceive their own death as out of their control--

)

·>:(

...

...! ti

0;:.;

34

thus they are disinclined to try to increase their life
expectancy by not smoking.

Templer (1972) reported that

fear of death correlated with the amount of smoking among
smoking subjects, although there were no significant differences between smokers, quitters, and nonsmokers.

However,

his findings were not replicated by either Berman (1973) or
McDonald (1976).

Frederick, Resnick, and Wittlin (1973),

comparing levels of morbidity and depression in heroin
addicts with abstinent and methadone maintenance controls,
found that addicts reported significantly more depression
and expectations of violent death.

Gertler, Ferneau, and

Raynes (1973) found that addicts reported significantly more
wishes for death than did control groups of hospital staff
and psychiatric patients.

The addicts and the psychiatric

patients also admitted to significantly more preoccupation
with thoughts of death.

Parker (1981), examining the mean-

ings associated with suicide in young suicidal drug abusers,
found that subjects judged as low-intent attempters perceived an overdose as a means of escaping tension rather
than as a suicide attempt per se.

However, the high-intent

suicide attempters tended to perceive their overdoses more
as attempts to die and to communicate personal needs.
Generally, there is no clear association between fear
of death and most risk-taking behavior, as studied with samples of deputies, policemen, skydivers, and students (Lester, 1967; Ford, Alexander, & Lester, 1971; Alexander & Les-
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ter, 1972; Mc Donald, 1976; Feifel & Nagy, 1980).

However,

there is some support for a relationship between fear of
death and suicide as a particular risk-taking behavior.
Lester (1967) found that college students who admitted to a
history of suicidal threats or attempts had significantly
less fear of death and admitted to seeing the manipulative
advantages of suicide.

Adams, Giffen, and Garfield (1973)

also found support for a risk-taking personality factor as a
correlate of suicide attempts.

In their study, suicide

attempters and matched psychiatric controls were given a
gambling task.

Seventy-one percent of the suicidal subjects

had been rated as "gambling" with their suicide attempt,
i.e. showing mixed feelings or intent, and this group took
significantly more risks than the controls.

However, Tar-

ter, Templer, and Perley (1974) found no significant correlation between death anxiety and risk or lethality of suicide attempt.

Their sample of hospitalized suicide attemp-

ters showed a small but significant correlation between
death anxiety and rescue potential, but difficulties with
the validity and reliability of their measure, the Templer
Death Anxiety Scale (McMordie, 1979; Durlak, 1982), make
these results difficult to interpret.

VII. Other Correlates and Measures of Death Attitudes

While no firm relationship between death attitudes and
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risk-taking behaviors has been established, there is evidence for a number of correlates of death anxiety or fear.
Pollack's (1979) review of the literature up to 1977 found
that women consistently express at least as much and usually
more death anxiety than men.

Both Berman and Hays (1973)

and Sadowski, Davis, and Loftus-Vergari (1979) also reported
finding significantly greater death anxiety in female subjects.

Berman and Hays (1973) also found a weak correlation

between death anxiety and a belief in afterlife, and no significant relationship between death anxiety and the Rotter
Locus of Control Scale.

However, Sadowski, Davis, and Lof-

tus-Vergari (1979) found some sex differences on the ReidWare Three Factor Locus of Control, with both sexes' death
anxiety loading primarily on a self-control factor, but
women's death anxiety loading secondarily on a social system
control factor, whereas men's secondary factor was that of
fatalism.
Pollack (1979) also reported that death anxiety shows
no direct correlation with age but is positively correlated
with an orientation toward the past, and shows no clear
relationship with physical deterioration or denial.

Fear of

death is a correlate of but is not equivalent to measures of
general anxiety or neuroticism, and shows little correlation
with dependency, guilt, or hostility (Pollack, 1979; Littlefield & Fleming, 1984).

It is positively correlated with

sensitization, and negatively correlated with a sense of
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self-efficacy, purpose, or meaning in life (Pollack, 1979).
Death anxiety has also been demonstrated to have some correlation with MMPI depression scores in both middle aged and
elderly subjects, but not with younger subjects (Templer,
1971).
Similarly, Lucas (1974) found some relationships
between death anxiety and MMPI depression scores for dialysis patients and their wives.

Death anxiety correlated with

neither seriousness of illness nor with most MMPI scales.
It was negatively correlated with the K scale and positively
correlated with scales 2 and 10 on the MMPI; it also correlated with other measures of anxiety, but less than their
intercorrelations, thus demonstrating some discriminant validity.

More recently Wagner and Lorion (1984) looked at

death anxiety and depression in several geriatric samples in
both the community and in institutions.

Their results indi-

cated little consistency in predictors of death anxiety, and
the authors concluded that death anxiety is a function of
the population examined, rather than a general characteristic per se of the elderly.

Thus, based on empirical find-

ings to date, any relationship between depression and death
anxiety is weak at best.

However, a clearer relationship

might be identified in relation to more specific death
attitudes.
Several researchers have in fact reported the need to
differentiate among different types of death attitudes,
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including differentiating attitudes toward personal death
from those regarding others' deaths.

Florian and Har-Evan

(1983) found sex differences in Jewish high school students'
perceptions of personal death.

Self-reported death atti-

tudes yielded six factors of personal death.

Female stu-

dents' fear of death was associated with loss of identity
and self-annihilation, whereas male subjects' fear of death
was associated with consequences for the family and punishment in the hereafter.

The authors suggested that the mean-

ings given to the fear of personal death reflected cultural
influences and merited further investigation.

Using a

broader age range in his sample, Devins (1979) examined
death attitudes relative to proximity of death and experiences with death.

He found death anxiety to be negatively

correlated with age and not significantly related to health
status.

He found that the factor "fear of personal death''

accounted for 20% of the variance in Templer's Death Anxiety
Scale scores, and suggested that heightened death anxiety
was associated with experiences of others' deaths that most
closely approximated one's expectations of one's own future
death.

Hoelter (1979) and Durlak (1982) also found Tem-

pler's Death Anxiety Scale to be multidimensional, noting
that the total score masked significant sources of variance
among its subscales.
Durlak and Kass (1981) factor analyzed fifteen of the
most widely used self-report death scales, which yielded
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five orthogonal death attitude factors: negative evaluation
of death, reluctance to interact with the dying, negative
reaction to pain, reaction to reminders of death, and preoccupation with thoughts of death.

The authors concluded

that the data supported the thanatological theory that death
attitudes are multidimensional and as such must be differentiated in assessment.

Durlak and Kass (1981) also sug-

gested "death attitudes" may be a more accurate descriptor
than simply "death fear" or "death anxiety," as reactions to
death appear to include worry, threat, depression, and nonacceptance as well as fear or anxiety.

Rigdon and Epting

(1982) reported an alternate analysis of the data from Durlak and Kass's (1981) study, theorizing a single factor
involving an individual's general response to personal
death.

In reply, Kass and Durlak (1982) justified their

choice of analyses and cited evidence supporting the multidimensionality of death attitudes.
Additional support was found for two of these factors-- negative evaluation of personal death and reactions
to reminders of death-- in a subsequent multitrait-multimethod study by Durlak and Kasimatis (in press).

Structured

interviews were used to assess the validity of responses on
seven self-report death scales, yielding moderate convergent
and discriminant validity for Dickstein's (1974) Negative
Evaluation of Death Scale, Nelson and Nelson's (1974) Death
Avoidance Scale, and Collett and Lester's (1969) Fear of
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Death of Others Scale.

The first scale measures negative

feelings about one's own death; the latter two relate to
reactions to reminders of death, such as a corpse or a
funeral.

The validity of these measures was supported in a

study by Kasimatis and Durlak (unpublished manuscript),

in

which the two death attitude factors were differentially
related to three different dimensions of religious orientation.
In summary, then, there are few clear relationships

between death attitudes and addiction or other risk-taking
behaviors.

Feifel and Nagy (1980) found few significant

differences in the death attitudes of alcoholics and controls, yet Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) found that
chronic alcoholics admitted to significantly more fear of
death than did binge alcoholics.

There is evidence that

smokers and heroin addicts have a morbid orientation toward
their own deaths (Gertler, Ferneau, & Raynes, 1973; Frederick, Resnick & Wittlin, 1973; Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 1979).
Death anxiety is significantly related to suicide as a risktaking behavior, but shows a weak correlation with depression (Lester, 1967; Adams, Giffen, & Garfield, 1973; Pollack, 1979).

Measures of death anxiety correlate with meas-

ures of general anxiety but demonstrate discriminant validity (Lucas, 1974; Pollack, 1979; Littlefield & Fleming,
1984).

There is growing evidence that death attitudes are

multidimensional and that attitudes toward personal death
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are distinct from more general attitudes toward death (Devins, 1977; Durlak & Kass, 1981; Durlak, 1982; Durlak & Kasimatis, in press).

These findings suggest that the rela-

tionship between alcoholics' death attitudes and their behavior may not be clear unless attitudes toward personal death
are differentiated from more general attitudes toward death.
Also, the findings with smokers and heroin addicts suggest
that alcoholics' attitudes toward their own deaths (as
opposed to more general death attitudes) are more likely to
covary with depression.

VIII. Summary of Literature and Hypotheses

The present study investigated the effects of depression on expectations of personal risk or harm among male
alcoholics.

Specifically, this study attempted to demon-

strate that alcoholics with varying degrees of depression
have widely discrepent perceptions of and attitudes toward
the destructive consequences of their drinking.

It was

expected that non- or low-depression alcoholics would minimize their personal vulnerability to the clearly adverse
sequelae of chronic alcoholism, whereas more depressed
alcoholics would more realistically assess their risks and
be much more negative in their perceptual biases.
In a review of the literature on the objective assessments of the risks associated with alcoholism, the research
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findings consistently demonstrated the shortened life expectancy of the chronic alcoholic, whether due to illness,
accident, suicide, or homicide (Farbarow,

1980; Combs-Orme

et al., 1983; Wilhelmsen, Elmfeldt, & Wedel,
et al., 1987).

1983; Rychtarik

However, research on the subjective assess-

ments of personal risk among addicted subjects, including
alcoholics, suggests that alcohol abuse or dependence is
associated with more subjective and unrealisticlly positive
expectations of reinforcement from alcohol (Schwebal &
Kaemmerer, 1977; Selzer et al., 1977; Brown et al., 1980;
Southwick et al., 1981; Rohsenow, 1983; Brown, Creamer, &
Stetson, 1987).
The fact that this bias is self-referent and not generalized is consistent with studies demonstrating that most
people encode information about themselves differently than
they encode information about others (Kuiper & Rogers, 1979;
Weary, 1980).

In fact, to a degree it may be not only nor-

mal but also adaptive to be optimistic in one's expectations
for one's future (Weinstein, 1982; Layne, 1983; Weinstein,
1984; Segal

& Shaw, 1986).

However, to the extent that an

unrealistically positive bias lessens anxiety, it can lessen
interest in preventive behavior and support risk-taking
behavior (Weinstein, 1982; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).

Given

the obvious risks associated with alcohol abuse, one could
plausibly speculate that alcoholic subjects' denial reflects
a more extreme form of positive bias (Selzer et al., 1977).
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Based on these research findings, the following were hypothesized:

Hypothesis 1. Low-depression subjects will show a positive bias in personal expectations regarding the consequences of their drinking.

Hypothesis 2. This positive bias will be circumscribed
to expectancies for personal wellbeing, and not more
global expectations for others.

Hypothesis 3. Given the risks inherent in their drinking behavior, low-depression alcoholics will show a
stronger positive bias than will low-depression medical patients.

High rates of depression and suicidal ideation or
attempts have been noted among alcoholics (Weissman et al.,
1977; Bascue & Epstein, 1980; Steer, McElroy, & Berg, 1983;
Behar, Winokur, & Berg, 1984; Berglund, 1984).

Furthermore,

depressed individuals have demonstrated more negative but
more realistic appraisals of themselves and their futures
(Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983; Layne, 1983;
Munoz & Lewinsohn, unpublished manuscript).

Again, this

bias is self-referent, not global, but it is skewed in the
opposite direction of biases held by nondepressed indiv-
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iduals (Bradley, 1983; Crocker, Kayne, & Alloy, 1985; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987).

Lewinsohn et al.

(1982)

and Munoz and Lewinsohn (unpublished manuscript) have suggested that a negative view of oneself is uniquely related
to depression and thus provides partial support for Beck's
cognitive triad of depression, although other research does
not support their conclusion (Gibson & Becker, 1973a;
Martin, Ward, & Clark,

1983).

In the more depressed alcoholic, then, there is the
potential for two opposing biases, the interaction of which
cannot readily be predicted on the basis of empirical literature.

Woodruff et al.

(1973b) found depressed alcoholics

to be more like nondepressed alcoholics than like patients
with unipolar affective disorder, whereas Gibson and Becker
(1973a) found depressed alcoholics' resp?nses to the Beck
Depression Inventory to closely resemble those of primary
depressives. Inasmuch as Gibson and Becker's (1973a) study
focused on the cognitive organization of depression, its
results are more likely to be predictive for this study.
Thus, based on these studies, the following were also hypothesized:

Hypothesis 4. More depressed subjects will show a
negative bias in personal expectations regarding
the consequences of their drinking.
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Hypothesis 5. This negative bias will be limited to
expectancies for personal wellbeing, and not global
expectations for others.

Hypothesis 6. More depressed alcoholics will show a
negative bias as well, and given the adverse consequences of their drinking, will be more extreme in
their bias than depressed nonalcoholic medical
patients.

It is clear that the most extreme risk of alcoholism
is premature death.

However, a review of the literature on

death attitudes and life-threatening behavior showed few
consistent relationships regarding the death attitudes of
the addictive population.

Feifel and Nagy (1980) found few

significant differences in the death attitudes of alcoholics
and controls, while Kumar, Vaidya, and Dwivedi (1982) found
subgroup differences in the death attitudes of different
types of alcoholics.

Smokers and heroin addicts have evi-

denced a somewhat morbid orientation toward their deaths
(Gertler, Ferneau, & Raynes, 1973; Resnik & Wittlin, 1973;
Schwebal & Kaemmerer, 1977).

Death anxiety shows some cor-

relation with suicidal risk, a weak correlation with depression, and no clear correlation with age or health status
(Lucas, 1974; Pollack, 1979; Wagner & Lorion, 1984).

A num-

ber of studies have shown attitudes toward personal death to
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be distinct from more general attitudes toward death (Devins, 1979; Durlak & Kass, 1981; Durlak, 1982; Durlak & Kasimatis, in press).

On the basis of these findings, the fol-

lowing was hypothesized:

Hypothesis 7: The positive bias of less depressed subjects and the negative bias of depressed subjects will
be evident only in evaluations of personal death, not
in evaluations of others' deaths.

Thus it was anticipated that alcoholics would show
significantly more extreme biases in their evaluations of
their personal health risks and mortality.

Depression was

expected to determine the direction of the bias for both the
experimental and comparison groups.

METHOD

I. Subjects

Subjects were selected from three outpatient programs
at the V.A. Medical Center in Milwaukee, Wisconsin: the
alcohol dependence treatment program, the aftercare (sobriety maintenance) program, and the hypertension clinic.
Participation was strictly voluntary, and involved filling
out a number of self-report measures.

All subjects were

male and were informally screened for exclusion of any Axis
I psychiatric disorders other than nonpsychotic depression
or substance abuse.

This criterion was included as higher

rates of some forms of psychopathology have been reported
among depressed, versus nondepressed, alcoholics (Hesselbrock et al. 1985).
Hypertensive outpatients were chosen as a comparison
group because they were expected to show a range of diff icul ties with depression and health problems, and their disease requires, like alcoholism, some changes in lifestyle.
Hypertension patients are also similar to alcoholic subjects
in that the exacerbation of their disease is to some extent
under their control.

Additionally, research suggests that a

comparison group of medical patients can be expected to be
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more similar to alcoholics in terms of demographic background, life stressors, personality traits, and range of
severity of depressive symptoms than would be primary
depressives (Woodruff et al,

1973b; Hamm, Major, & Brown,

1979; Coryell, Pfohl, & Zimmerman, 1984; Lloyd, 1984).
Sampling from an outpatient population was expected to
avoid some of the stresses and depression attributable to
extended lengths of stay in a hospital, involving disruptions of jobs and separations from families.

Similarly,

alcoholics at two different points in treatment were sampled
in an attempt to identify changes in cognitions across
treatment and levels of depression (Nakamura et al., 1983).
Additionally, all outpatient groups had received some education regarding the nature and treatment of their diseases,
which ruled out the possibility of ignorance regarding the
potential risks associated with their conditions.

Five

hypertensive subjects reporting a significant drinking
problem, as evidenced by either prior treatment for alcoholism or a Short Michigan Alcoholism Screening Test (SMAST)
score of three or more, were excluded from the sample.

Sim-

ilarly, nine alcoholics were excluded who reported treatment
for hypertension.
each.

The final groups contained forty subjects

The overall intent was to establish three groups of

subjects differing in their experience with alcohol but
relatively equivalent in their demographic backgrounds.
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II. Procedure

Alcoholic subjects were solicited from the group
therapy sessions of both the outpatient alcohol dependence
treatment and the aftercare programs.

Hypertensive patients

were recruited individually as they waited for their medical
appointments. The experimenter briefly described the purpose
of the study and explained what participation would entail.
Subjects were also informed of the confidentiality of their
responses and their right to withdraw at any time.

Volun-

teers were then asked to sign an informed consent sheet and
given a packet of measures. The measures appeared in counterbalanced order and were identifiable only by a subject
number. Some subjects filled out the forms with an experimenter present; others received a postage-paid envelope in
which to return their forms.

Of those who agreed to parti-

cipate in the study (slightly over 70% of those solicited),
there was a 82% return rate with only seven instances of
incomplete data.

III. Materials

Utility of Self-Report Measures.
this study were self-report instruments.

All measures used in
There was no

~

priori basis for questioning the validity of the responses
of the comparison group, and previous research suggests that
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most alcoholics give valid self-reports.

In a frequently

cited study, Sobell and Sobell (1975) reported that outpatient alcoholics in voluntary treatment gave valid and
reliable reports of their personal and drinking histories.
Responses to structured interviews were compared to patient
records and were found to be 86% valid, with most of the
invalid interview responses being overestimates of the
recorded behaviors.

Over 90% of the responses were reliable

when retested after a three week interval (Sobell & Sobell,
1975).

Only subjects in treatment because of a court order

offered less reliable data, and the authors recommended
excluding these subjects for research purposes.

However,

Sobell and Sobell (1978) later reported that, for alcoholics
in outpatient treatment, court-ordered patients gave just as
valid self-reports as did voluntary patients for both alcohol- and nonalcohol-related questions, again with invalid
self-reports typically involving a significant over-reporting of the behaviors (Sobel! & Sobel!, 1978).
Polich (1982) interviewed alcoholics and their collaterals four years post-treatment, and reported results
consistent with earlier studies: self-reports of concrete
drinking problems were generally valid, although some subjects tended to underestimate recent drinking.

However,

overall the self-reports were consistent with the reports of
collaterals, with discrepencies mostly involving overreporting by the alcoholics.

Polich (1982) recommended

51
treating self-reports as valid but utilizing multiple measures since validity varied with the types of self-reports.
Similarly, Stacy et al.

(1985) found satisfactory validity

for self-reports of several types of substance abuse,
including alcohol use.
Several studies also indicate that direct measures are
at least as valid as indirect measures of death attitudes.
Littlefield and Fleming (1984) reported significant positive
correlations between direct and indirect measures of death
anxiety.

Handel et al.

(1984} found that direct measures of

death anxiety were statistically and meaningfully correlated to each other, whereas a lack of any significant correlations among the indirect measures raised a question as
to their validity.

The authors found no consistent rela-

tionships between direct measures of death anxiety and
indirect measures, or with the variables of social desirability or age.

Durlak and Kasimatis's (in press) multi-

trait-multimethod study demonstrated the validity of the two
death attitude scales used in the present study, and their
results were replicated in a subsequent study (Kasimatis &
Durlak, unpublished manuscript).

Thus, self-report measures

have been shown to provide valid and reliable data on both
alcohol- and nonalcohol-related behaviors, and for reports
of death anxiety.
Independent Measures.

Subjects were asked to complete

a demographic questionnaire, the Short Michigan Alcoholism
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screening Test, the Sensation Seeking Scale Form V, the
short form of the Social Desirability Scale, and the Beck
Depression Inventory.

A copy of each measure used is in

Appendix A.
Demographic Questionnaire.

The demographic question-

naire was developed for this study.

Aside from standard

information regarding age, race, marital status, etc., the
respondents were asked to rate, on a seven-point Lickert
scale, the degree of significant change in their lives in
the last year.

This measure of life change was used as an

index of personal stress (Lloyd, 1984).

Since both alco-

holism (Selzer et al., 1977; Rychtarik et al., 1987) and
depression (Petty & Nasrullah, 1981; Layne, 1983; Nezu &
Ronan, 1985; Krantz, 1985) have been shown to be associated
with increased rates of stress, this item assessed whether
the groups were comparable in terms of the perceived difficulties in their lives.

If not, any effects of this dimen-

sion could then be isolated in the data analyses.
Short Michisan Alcoholism Screening Test (SMAST).

The

SMAST (Selzer, Vinokur, & van Rooijan, 1975) is the short
form of the revised MAST, originally developed by Selzer
(1971).

The original MAST is a twenty-four item self-report

measure with acceptable degrees of reliability and validity.
MAST cutoff scores correctly identify 99% of alcoholic respondents (Selzer, 1971). Zung and Charalampous's (1975b)
item analysis of the MAST yielded additional support for its
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internal validity.

Three of the four weakest items identi-

fied in Zung and Charalampous's (1975b) study are among the
items excluded in the SMAST, which contains only thirteen
items from the original scale but possesses comparable validity, reliability, and distribution of scores.

The SMAST

also shows weak correlations with age and denial, and a
score of three or more has been recommended as a criterion
for alcohol abuse (Selzer, Vinokur, & van Rooijan, 1975).
Sensation Seeking Scale Form V (SSS).

The SSS is a

forty-item forced-choice measure, the product of a number of
revisions and validations of the scale first developed by
Zuckerman et al.(1964).

The original scale consisted of

fifty-four items designed to quantify the construct of optimal stimulation level.

Items are in a forced-choice format

for indicating preferences for extremes of sensation, for
familiarity and routines, for enjoyment of danger and adventure, and for the stimulation value of others.

A general

factor of sensation seeking, independent of measures of
anxiety and psychopathology, was validated for both men and
women undergraduates (Zuckerman & Link, 1968).

Originally

conceptualized as a desire for "optimal level of arousal,''
sensation seeking has more recently been theorized as
reflecting differential biological sensitivity to stimulation as reinforcement (Galazio, Rosenthal, & Stein, 1983).
Subsequent factor analyses and cross-cultural validation established the reliability of three factors-- Thrill

54

and Adventure Seeking, Experience Seeking, and Disinhibition-- plus a less reliable factor of Boredom Susceptibility
(Zuckerman,

1971; Zuckerman, Eysenck, & Eysenck, 1978).

Total scores consistently decline with age (Zuckerman,
Eysenck, & Eysenck,

1978).

Both total scores and Disinhi-

bition factor scores have shown significant correlations
with alcohol and drug use in a number of different populations (Zuckerman, 1971; Galazio, Rosenthal, & Stein, 1983).
Social Desirabilty Scale (SDS). As a validity check, a
short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale
was included in the present study, as recommended by Stacy
et al.

(1985).

The original SDS (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) is

a measure of social desirability as a response tendency with
self-report instruments.

It contains 33 items describing

relatively rare culturally approved behaviors, endorsement
of which is minimally related to clinical psychopathology
(Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).

Reynolds (1982) developed a thir-

teen item short form of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale with an acceptable level of reliability

(~=

.76), item-total score correlations ranging from .32 to .47,
and an overall correlation of .93 (R<.01) with the original
SDS.
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI).

The BDI is a widely

used instrument in both research and the clinical treatment
of depression.

The measure was originally validated in two

studies with psychiatric subjects, but has also demonstrated
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its applicability with mildly depressed individuals, suicidal patients, medical patients, and alcoholics (Dobson &
Breiter, 1983; Steer, McElroy, & Beck, 1983; Campbell, Burgess, & Finch, 1984; Oliver & Simmons, 1985; Clark et al.,
1985).

Reports of BDI reliability coefficients range from

.86 to .93 (Kuiper & McCabe, 1985).

The concurrent validity

of the BDI has been shown with a number of criterion measures, including the Hamilton Rating Scale, Zung Self-Rating
Scale for Depression, Automatic Thoughts Questionnaire, Dysfunctional Attitude Scale, and the depression subscale of
the MMPI (Beck, Weissman, & Kovacs, 1976; Finkle, Glass, &
Merluzzi, 1982; Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Hesselbrock et al.,
1983; Steer, McElroy, & Beck, 1983; Campbell, Burgess, &
Finch, 1984).
Hesselbrock et al.

(1983) raised a question as to the

specificity of the BDI for diagnosing depression in inpatient alcoholics, using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule as
their criterion measure.

However, several methodological

problems with their study, including potential confounds of
sampling and treatment effects, make their results difficult
to interpret (Hagan & Schauer, 1985; Hesselbrock et al.,
1985).

Still, the authors' argument for comparable opera-

tional definitions of depression across studies has merit,
and does lend additional significance to the generally wide
support that has been found for the BDI's internal consistency, test-retest reliability, and for the interpretation
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of the total score as a state measure of the cognitive
aspects of depression (Dobson & Breiter, 1983; Campbell,
Burgess, & Finch, 1984; Oliver & Simmons, 1985).
The BDI is a twenty-one item measure, in which respondents are asked to select one of four statements that best
describes themselves.

The statements reflect a gradation of

severity of a depressive symptom.

Items are balanced to

reflect cognitive, motivational, affective, and vegetative
signs of depression. Total scores range from 0 to 63, with
higher scores reflecting more· severe symptoms.

Beck's ori-

ginal ranges for a normal population were: 10-15= mild,
16-23= moderate, and 24+= severe depression (Oliver & Simmons, 1984).

Subsequently, ranges of 9-12, 13-15, and more

than 15 representing, respectively, mild, moderate, and
severe depression in normal and medical patients, have been
recommended for research purposes (Beck, Weissman, & Kovacs,
1976; Finkle, Glass, & Merluzzi, 1983; Campbell, Burgess, &
Finch, 1984; Kuiper & McCabe, 1985).
In summary, then, the data from the independent measures were obtained in order to assess the comparability of
the three subject groups on several demographic variables,
as well as for the range of scores for depression and perceived life stressors.

The potentially confounding factors

of social desirability and sensation seeking were also
assessed.

SMAST scores of three or more, and/or reports of

treatment for alcoholism, were used to corroborate group
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assignment.
Dependent Variables.

The dependent variables in this

study included a Future Health Inventory, adapted from Weinstein's (1982) format, Collett and Lester's (1969) Fear of
Death of Others Scale, and Dickstein's (1972) Negative Evaluation of Death Scale.

Also used was the revised short form

of the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (Brown et al., 1980;
Rohsenow, 1983).

Copies of these measures are in Appendix

B.
The Future Health Inventory (FHI) and the short form
of the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ) were developed
and validated in a pilot study with fifty-six volunteer subjects from the V.A. hospital domiciliary.

In the Human Sub-

jects Review Committee of the V.A. Medical Center, a question was raised as to the subjects' ability to manage the
formats and length of the proposed measures.

A pilot study

was thus developed to assess the clarity of the instructions
of the FHI and to see which of two measures, the Subjective
Probability Questionnaire (SPQ) (Lewinsohn et al., 1982) or
the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ)

(Brown et al., 1980;

Rohsenow, 1983), was more amenable to a short form version.
A detailed description of the pilot study can be found in
Appendix

c.

The subjects showed no difficulty with the

instructions or the format of the FHI.

The measure also had

acceptable test-retest reliability, with an average correlation

of~=

.58.
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The results of the pilot study also supported the use
of the revised AEQ for the present study.

The AEQ was sim-

pler in format, and its content focused on expectations of
reinforcement from alcohol.

Item-scale, part-whole, and

simultaneous multiple correlations allowed construction of a
shorter form of the AEQ that maintained comparable or better item-scale correlations, ranging from

~=

.38 to .86.

The results of the pilot thus validated the used of the FHI
and the short form of the AEQ for the purposes of the present study.
Future Health Inventory (FHI).

The FHI was adapted

from the format used by Weinstein (1982) to assess perceptions of susceptibility to various health problems.

Respon-

dents estimated their risk for sixteen different health
problems relative to the risk for other men their age.

They

were asked to assess their comparative risk on a seven-point
continuum ranging from (-3) much below average to (+3) much
above average.

The items ranged from relatively minor prob-

lems such as gum disease to more serious conditions such as
lung cancer.

The content was balanced to include items that

were hypothesized to be relevant for alcoholism (e.g., liver
disease), hypertension (stroke), both conditions (ulcer), or
neither (strep throat).

The relevance of the items was

assumed to be obvious and not dependent on any special knowledge: that is, subjects' participation in the educational
segment of their treatment would be sufficient to acquaint
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them with the relevancy of these items for their conditions.
Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ),

The original AEQ

is an eighty item measure of beliefs about the effects of
alcohol.

Forty self-referent and forty other-referent

statements are presented, which subjects rate as true or
false based on their own experience.

The items load onto

eight expectancy scales, for which Rohsenow (1983) reports
internal consistency ratings (using Cronbach's alpha) ranging from .49 to .74.

Six of the subscales relate to expec-

tations of positive consequences of drinking: specifically,
for global positive experiences, social and physical pleasure, sexual enhancement, increased power or aggression,
increased social assertiveness, and relaxation or tension
reduction.

Two additional subscales measure expectations of

the negative consequences of impairment and carelessness.
The short form of the AEQ, validated in the pilot study,
contained only 70 items but showed comparable internal consistancy and test-retest reliability (cf. Appendix C).
Death Attitude Scales.

The two death attitude meas-

ures selected for this study both demonstrate convergent and
discriminant validity for attitudes towards death of self
and death of others (Durlak and Kasimatis, accepted for
publiction).

Collett and Lester's (1969) Fear of Death of

Others Scale is a seven-item measure of the degree of one's
negative reaction to the possible death of family members or
close friends.

There is a five-point continuum of agreement
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to both positively and negatively worded statements such as,
"I could not accept the finality of the death of a friend."
A higher score reflects more concern about the loss of loved
ones.
Negative views of one's own death are measured by
Dickstein's (1972) Negative Evaluation of Death Scale.

The

scale contains five items such as, "The prospect of my own
death depresses me."

The respondents state their agreement

with each item along a four-point continuum.

As with the

other death attitude scale, higher scores indicate more
negative attitudes.

IV. Analyses

The original proposal suggested the use of two-way
ANOVA's and multivariate 2x3x2 repeated measures MANOVA's to
test for significant main effects and the interaction of
group membership and degree of depression.

Initial descrip-

tive analyses, however, indicated the need for hierarchical
multiple regression analyses.

Specifically, there were some

significant differences between group means on some demographic variables such as age

(~=

12.55,

~<.001).

Also,

examination of the group means and the grand correlation
matrix suggested the need to partial out the effects of the
potential confounding variables of stress, sensation seeking, and social desirability.

And most importantly, the
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distribution of the BDI scores was positively skewed in such
a way as to preclude any meaningful separation into low,
medium, and high groups (Table 1).
Hierarchical multiple regression analyses were selected for a number of reasons.

First of all, multiple regres-

sion correlations can incorporate a variety of coded data,
including nominal categories and continuous variables.

BDI

scores could then be retained as a continuous variable, more
clearly reflecting the distribution of scores.

Secondly,

multiple regression correlations index the association
between a dependent variable and an optimally weighted combination of multiple independent variables, testing the significance of the combined independent variables as well as
the unique contribution of each independent variable.

The

amount of the dependent variable variance accounted for
uniquely by a particular independent variable is expressed
as a semipartial (sr) correlation, and its significance is
assessed with a 1-test.

Using multiple regression corre-

lations thus permits analysis of the collective and individual influences of the independent variables.
By utilizing a hierarchical procedure, an analysis of
covariance could be incorporated by first entering the
potentially confounding independent variables as a set.
Their effects are then partialled before testing the hypothesized main predictors.

Similarly, main effects must be

partialled before testing interaction variables.
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TABLE 1: Distribution of BDI Scores

BDI SCORE RANGES
0-4

GROUP

5-9

10-14

15-19

20-24

25-29

30-36

(ti)

Outpatient
Alcoholic

40

9

6

6

6

9

1

3

Aftercare
Alcoholic

40

11

12

11

1

3

1

1

Hypertensive

40

10

12

9

5

3

1

0

Combined

120

30

30

26

12

15

3

4
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Thus, the multiple regressions were run in three
stages, entering first the covariates, then testing for main
effects of depression and group membership, and then for the
interactions of depression and group membership.

This

hierarchical approach was the most conservative test possible, as any shared variance between the covariates and the
variables of interest was attributed solely to the covariates in the first stage of the analyses.

This conserva-

tive apportioning of variance minimized the likelihood of
spurious significant main effects or interactions due to the
number of variables in the regression equations.

RESULTS

Comparability of Groups.

Group means were examined

with one-way between-group ANOVA's for all independent variables.

These data are summarized in Table 2.

Overall the

groups were highly comparable, i.e. showed no significant
differences in terms of most demographic variables, including years of education ([= .59) and socioeconomic status ([=
2.97).

The only significant demographic differences were in

terms of age (f= 12.55, p<.001) and perceived life stress
(~=

11.53, E<.001).

In both instances the greatest differ-

ence was between the hypertension and the two alcoholic
groups, with the hypertension group being older and reporting less life change or stress.

The outpatient alcoholic,

aftercare, and hypertension groups reported very similar and
relatively low BDI scores, with respective means of 13.6
(SD= 9), 11 (SD=7.7), and 9.3 (SD=6.6),
As anticipated, SMAST score differences were highly
significant (f= 190.5, p<.001), reflecting their use to
corroborate group assignment.

Less anticipated was the

strong social desirability difference ([= 8.93, p<.001),
wherein again the hypertensive group differed more from the
two other groups, showing more social desirability effects.
The hypertensive subjects also differed significantly from
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TABLE 2: One-Way Between Group ANOVA's on Independent Variables
GROUP
Outpatient

!1

(SD)

Aftercare

!1

(SD)

Hypertension

!1

£'.(2,117)

(SD)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

***

age

47.35 ( 11. 6)

45.85 (11.2)

57.30 (10.0)

years of education

12.12 ( 1. 7)

12.60 ( 1. 8)

12.30 ( 2. 3)

SES

1. 35 (.88)

1. 78 ( 1. 1)

1. 95 ( 2. 0)

2.97

life change

5.65 ( 1. 6)

4.92 ( 1. 5)

3.78 (2.0)

11. 53

BDI

13.62 (9.0)

10.95 ( 7. 7)

9.32 (6.6)

2.97

SMAST

9.88 ( 2. 9)

10.18 ( 2. 5)

1.18 ( 1. 4)

190.50

***

social desirability

4,55 ( 3. 1)

4.42 (2.6)

6.88 ( 2. 9)

8.93

***

sensation seeking

15.98 ( 7. 5)

18.58 ( 5. 9)

12.95 (6.9)

6.66

**

*.12.<.05
**.12.<.0l
***.12.<.00l

12.55
.59

***
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the alcoholic groups in reporting less sensation seeking
behavior (E= 6.66,

~<.01).

Examination of the grand corre-

lation matrix revealed significant correlations between age
and the independent variables of social desirability
.36,

~<.001)

and sensation seeking

(~=

-.46,

~<.001).

(~=

The

overlap of variance between these variables suggested that
they were confounded with each other, as well as potential
confounds of the dependent variables.
Thus, there were either empirical or theoretical bases
for retaining the independent variables of age, life stress,
social desirability, and sensation seeking as covariates to
be included in the first stage of the multiple regression
analyses.

The covariates were treated as potential con-

founds, and their effects were partialled out in the first
stage of the multiple regressions, in order to provide a
cleaner and more stringent test for the hypothesized main
effects and interactions of depression and group membership.
For the purposes of the analyses, dummy coding was
employed to allow comparisons between the outpatient alcoholic (OP) group and both the aftercare (AF) and hypertensive (HY) groups: dummy coding represents membership in ttg••
mutually exclusive groups in a series of ttg-1'' dichotomies
(Cohen & Cohen, 1975).

In other words, the outpatient alco-

holies were treated as the reference group against which to
compare the scores of the aftercare group and the hypertensive group.

The remaining set of comparisons, between the
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aftercare and hypertensive groups, were calculated from the
mean square of residuals from the regression equations, with
an adjustment of the degrees of freedom (cf. Cohen & Cohen,
p. 186).

Through the multiple regression equations and the

subsequent analyses of the residual variance, the significant covariate effects, main effects, and interactions were
identified.

I. First Stage of the Multiple Regression Analyses

Table 3 summarizes the pattern of covariate effects
identified in the first stage of the analyses.

In this

first stage, any dependent variable variance attributable to
age, social desirability, life stress, or sensation seeking
was isolated and tested for its significance.

Despite group

differences, the effect of age was not significant for any
of the dependent variables, probably an artifact of its
shared variance with the other variables of social desirability and sensation seeking.

Social desirability had a

significant inverse relationship to every one of the selfreferent dependent variables, as well as for the "global
positive feelings" subscale of the other-referent version of
the AEQ. The -t values' ranged from -5.48
"power" subscale, to -2.03
subscale.

(~<.05)

(~<.001),

for the

for the "relaxation"

This suggests a defensive bias on the part of

many of the subjects, particularly in terms of how they
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TABLE 3: Covariate Effects from the First Stage
of the Multiple Regression Analyses
COVARIATES
age

social
desirability

sensation
seeking

life
stress

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Self-referent
FHI

-0.93

-3.39

***

1. 30

AEQ
global
pleasure
sexual
power
social
relaxation
impairment
carelessness

1. 56
-0.12
0.78
0.44
0.57
-0.65
-1. 26
-0.44

-4.20
-2.82
-2.11
-5.48
-3.26
-2.03
-2.25
-3.15

***
**
*

2.50
1. 71
2.21
2.14
3.34
2.26
-0.09
1. 23

NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF OWN DEATH -0.95

***
**
*
*
**

-0.39

*
*
*
***
**

-1. 77
-1.01
-1. 55
1.64
0.32
-0.13
2.24 *
2.07 *

-2.61 *

-1. 24

-0.96

-1. 94
-2.10 *
-1. 34
0.35
-1. 01
-0.14
-0.35
0.36

Other-referent
AEQ
global
pleasure
sexual
power
social
relaxation
impairment
carelessness

1. 83
0.30
-0.10
-0.62
-0.94
-1. 38
0.17
-0.29

-3.06 **
-0.72
0.21
-1. 82
-0.96
0.50
-0.28
-0.70

1. 13
1. 32
1. 05
0.21
0.13
0.64
-0.37
-0.53

FEAR OF DEATH
OF OTHERS

-0.91

2.01 *

-0.03

Note. i-tests of significance (1,115)
*:12.<.05
**:12.<.0l
***:12.<.00l

1.02
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described themselves and their own vulnerabilities.

In

general, subjects with higher social desirability scores
tended to acknowledge fewer concerns or negative views about
their health risks, their susceptibility to alcohol, or
their own deaths.

A social desirability effect was also

evidenced for Collett & Lester's (1969) Fear of Death of
Others Scale, although in the opposite direction
R<.05).

(1= 2.01,

It seems, then, that subjects presenting them-

selves in a socially desirable light endorsed significantly
fewer negative attitudes toward their own deaths but more
negative or fearful ones for the deaths of others.
Sensation seeking proved to have a significant effect
for all but one of the self-referent AEQ subscales that
measure anticipation of positive effects from drinking.

In

other words, sensation seeking showed a strong positive
relationship to personal expectations of positive consequences of drinking, including global positive feelings
2.50, R<.05), feelings of sexual enhancement
R<.05), power

(1=

(1= 2.21,

(1= 2.14, R<.05), social assertion (1= 3.34,

R<.001), and relaxation

(1= 2.26, R<.01).

Conversely, among

the self-referent measures, the perception of personal
stress, as measured by recent life change, was significantly
related to only the two subscales describing the negative
consequences of drinking, namely impairment
and carelessness

(1= 2.07, R<.05).

(1= 2.24, R<.05)

This relationship was

positive, suggesting that those subjects experiencing higher
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levels of stress were more conscious of the adverse consequences of drinking.

The variable of personal stress also

showed a negative relationship to one of the other-referent
positive expectancy subscales-- for enhancement of pleasure
(~=

-2.10,

~<.05)--

suggesting that more stressed subjects

also perceived drinking as less pleasurable generally.

II. Second Stage of the Multiple Regression Analyses

With the effects of social desirability, sensation
seeking, and stress partialled out in the first stage of the
multiple regression analyses, the second stage tested for
significant self-other differences and for the main effects
of depression and group membership.
marized in Tables 4 & 5.

These findings are sum-

It should be noted that the signs

of these values are a function of the dummy coding, and
their interpretation was based on examination of group means
and variable intercorrelations, as well as individual subject scores for interaction effects.
As hypothesized, there were significant differences in
the scores of the self-referent and other referent measures.
The two versions of the AEQ showed that subjects never considered themselves to be more influenced by alcohol than
were others.

In fact,

in 22 of 24 appraisals (92%) of the

potential consequences of drinking, all subject groups
viewed themselves as less affected by alcohol than were
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TABLE 4: Summary of Group Means for
AEQ and Death Attitude Scales
GROUP
Outpatient
40 >

Af~rcare

referent
self other

referent
self other

rn.=

(li= 40)

Hypertension

All Subjects
(li= 120)

referent
self other

i(l,114)

(li= 40)

ABQ SUBSCALBS
alobal positive

1.8

1.4

2.0
3.8

pleaaure

4.0
3.9
3.0

3.0

power

2.5
1.9

2.7
1.9

3.5
social assertion 3.0

3.4

1. 9

3,4

3.1

2.9

5.67

***

7.55

***

4.72

***

6.14

***

7.14

***

3.78

***

2.29

*

3. 20

**

3.5

3.4
relaxation

***

3.7

3.4
3.2

6.64
1.6

4.2

2.7

2.6

sexual

1.0

2.2

3.2

2.1
3.4

3.0

2.9

a

4.2

impairment

3.9

3.4

4.8

4.2
3.3

careleaane••

3.4

DEATH ATTITUDE
SCALES

2.8
3.7

3.7

10.8

11.0

25

3.8

10.3
25

24.6

a
outpatient alcoholic-hypertension group difference

E<2,112>= 3.37
*2<.05
**2<. 01

***.R.<. 001

*
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TABLE 5: Significant Main Effects and Interaction
of Depression by Groups
VARIABLE
Depression

OP vs. HY

AF vs. HY

BDI x
OP vs. HY

DEPENDENT VARIABLES
Self-referent
FHI

3.77

AEQ
global
pleasure
sexual
power
social
relaxation
impairment
carelessness

1.99

2.04
2.05

***

*
*
*

-3.31

***

-2.94

**

-2.23

*

2.56
4.29

2. 82
4,49
3. 00

*

***
**
***
**
2.07

NEGATIVE EVALUATION OF OWN DEATH
Other-referent
AEQ
global
pleasure
sexual
power
social
relaxation
impairment

-2.07

*

2.46

*

2. 75
2.17
2. 78

**
*
**

-2.30

*

FEAR OF DEATH
OF OTHERS
Note.

~-tests

of main effects (1,112) and interactions (1,110)

Note. OP= outpatient, HY= hypertensive, AF= aftercare groups

*!!<. 05
Ug<.01
***.12.< .001

*
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others.

This self-other difference proved to be significant

for every one of the AEQ subscales, as well as for the measures of attitudes toward death.

Table 4 includes i-tests of

the adjusted self-other score differences, and Appendix D
contains a description of how the difference scores were
derived.

As hypothesized, scores of self-referent measures

were significantly less than those of other-referent measures, with i values ranging from 2.29 to 7.55.

Contrary to

hypotheses, there were no significant group differences in
terms of degree of self-other discrepency, except that the
outpatient alcoholics showed significantly less self-other
difference in expectations of alcohol-related impairment
than did the hypertensive subjects (E= 3.37,

~<.05).

In terms of group membership, there were no significant differences between the outpatient and aftercare
groups.

Not surprisingly, there were also no significant

interactions between this group comparison and BDI scores.
However, a number of group main effects were found in comparisons of each of the alcoholic groups with the hypertensive group.

Overall, the pattern of effects indicate

little difference between the two alcoholic groups, while
alcoholics differed from the nonalcoholic comparison group
in having significantly more positive expectations of alcohol consumption for themselves, and more positive and fewer
negative perceptions of drinking in general.

While differ-

ences in expectations were not, as hypothesized, strictly
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self-referent, they were stronger in reference to oneself
than for others (see Table 5).
For example, compared to the hypertension group, the
outpatient alcoholics anticipated significantly more pleasure (i= -3.31, R<.001), social assertion (i= -2.94, R<.01),
and relaxation (i= -2.23, R<.05) for themselves, and significantly more global positive feelings (i= -2.07, R<.05)
and less impairment (i= 2.46, R<.05) for others who drink.
The aftercare group also described significantly stronger
expectations of pleasure (i=

4~29,

R<.001), social asser-

tion (i= 4.49, R<.001), and relaxation (i= 3.00, R<.01), as
well as global positive feelings (i= 2.56, R<.05), and
feelings of enhanced power (i= 2.82, R<.01) for themselves.
The aftercare group also differed from the hypertension
group in their expectations for others to experience more
global positive feelings (i= 2.75, R<.01), enhanced pleasure (i= 2.17, R<.05) and sexual feelings (i= 2.78, R<.01),
and decreased impairment (i= -2.30, R<.05).
Examination of the group means (Table 4) indicated
that, as hypothesized, the two alcoholic groups, while
describing themselves as less affected by alcohol than
others, still expected to experience significantly more
benefits from drinki.ng than did the hypertensive subjects.
However, the minimalization of potential alcohol-related
impairment was not, as hypothesized, self-referent but
rather other-referent, describing drinkers in general.

It
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was only among more depressed subjects that this vulnerability to impairment was consistently self-referent or
internalized (Table 5).
As hypothesized, level of depression had a significant
main effect for several of the self-referent but none of the
other-referent dependent variables.

Specifically, depres-

sion showed a significant positive relationship to percep-

(i= 3.77,

tions of personal health risk

expectations of sexual enhancement
assertion
drinking

(i= 2.03,
(~=

2.05,

~<.05),
~<.05).

~<.001),

(i= 1.99,

and to

~<.05),

social

and potential impairment from
Depression's association with

expectations of relaxation from drinking also approached
significance

(i= 1.95,

~<.10).

The more depressed subjects

thus reported more personal vulnerability to illness, or to
being affected by drinking.

Essentially, more depressed

subjects had less illusion of personal invulnerability.
However, the more depressed subjects' drinking-related
expectations were not negative in all areas.

While they did

anticipate significantly more impairment, they also had
stronger expectations of enhancement of their own sexual and
social feelings from drinking, compared to less depressed
subjects.

In all, the significant effect of depression for

several self-referent but no other-referent measures lends
support to the hypothesized relevancy of depression for
influencing personal but not general perceptions of vulnerability.

While depression's effect was specifically self-

76

referent, it was not a simple one, as it involved enhancement of both positive and negative expectations regarding
the consequences of drinking.

III. Third Stage of the Multiple Regression Analyses

The final stage of the analyses tested for significant
interactions between group membership and level of depression.

Only one significant interaction was identified:

level of depression interacted with the outpatient alcoholic-hypertension group comparison for expectations of personal impairment

(i= 2.07,

~<.05).

The interpretation of

this interaction is not straightforward, primarily because
substantial scatter in scores, especially among the less
depressed subjects, obscures any clear trend in the relationship (see Figures 1 & 2).

Generally, degree of depres-

sion is positively related to degree of perceived personal
impairment from drinking for both the outpatient and hypertensive subjects, and this relationship is stronger at
higher levels of depression.

While the direction of this

relationship is as expected, the interaction occurs because
the depression-impairment relationship is relatively
stronger for the hypertension group, contrary to the hypotheses.

In other words, the level of depression had rela-

tively less, not more, influence on perception of personal
impairment for alcoholic (versus nonalcoholic) subjects.
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FIGURE 1: Interaction of Depression by Alcoholic
Group for Expectancy of Impairment
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FIGURE 2: Interaction of Depression by Hypertensive
Group for Expectation of Impairment
'
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DISCUSSION

The present study investigated the effects of level of
depression on male alcoholics' expectations of personal risk
or harm.

It was hypothesized that less depressed subjects

would be optimisitcally biased, whereas more depressed subjects would be more sober and realistic in their appraisals
of their personal vulnerability, whether specific to the
consequences of drinking or more broadly in reference to
personal health and mortality.· It was also hypothesized
that this bias would be specific to personal expectations,
and that it would be more pronounced among alcoholic subjects.
In general, the data supported most of these hypotheses.

Level of depression was positively associated with

perceptions of vulnerability to the effects of drinking and
to general health risks, although it was not significantly
related to attitudes toward death.

Depression's effect was,

as hypothesized, circumscribed to personal expectations;
however, alcoholic and nonalcoholic subjects differed in
terms of general as well as personal expectations of the
consequences of alcohol consumption.

And the data failed to

support the hypothesized interaction between alcoholism and
depression, suggesting instead that the effects of depres79
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sion were highly comparable for alcoholic and nonalcoholic
subjects alike.

Before discussing these findings at length,

however, some consideration should be given to the variables
"partialled out'' in the first stage of the analyses, since
the main effects identified can only be interpreted in the
context of the covariates that had been taken into account.

I. Correlates of the Self-Report Data

Exclusive reliance on self-report measures necessarily
raises a question as to the validity of the current data.
Alcoholics in particular are notorious for their defensive
presentations of themselves, and on a common sense level,
their self-reports would be especially suspect, despite such
findings as those of Sobel! & Sobel! (1975) and Polich
(1982), that indicate that alcoholics do give valid selfreports.

For the purposes of this research, self-report

measures were clearly the most direct method of assessing
subjects' expectations; validity questions would also be
raised for less direct methods such as therapist rating
scales, or inferences of motives from observed behavior.
Also, alcoholic subjects in treatment could conceivably perceive a demand to emphasize more negative views of drinking
and its consequences.

Sampling subjects at two different

points in treatment and including a measure of social desirability effects were intended to help address the question
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of the validity of responses.
Social desirability, in fact, proved to be a potent
intervening variable, particularly in relation to the selfreferent dependent variables.

The significant social desir-

ability effect for all of the "self" measures but only two
of the ''other" measures is consistent with Kuiper's (1979)
and Guidano and Liotti's (1983) theories that information
about oneself is organized and evaluated differently from
other, more general knowledge or beliefs.

Subjects with a

more socially desirable response style were distinctly more
defensive in their presentations of themselves, describing
less vulnerability to general health problems or to any
effects, positive or negative, from drinking.

Social desir-

ability also showed a very distinct relationship to attitudes toward death, being inversely related to negative
evaluations of personal death but positively associated with
fear of death of others.

Apparently subjects viewed expres-

sions of concern over the loss of loved ones to be more socially acceptable than expressions of negative feelings about
one's own death.

Again, this was consistent with a general

pattern of describing less concern and/or perception of personal vulnerability.

It is also consistent with Feifel and

Nagy's (1980) report that alcoholics reported little conscious fear or concern about their deaths.
Social desirability, then, was an important variable
to take into account.

It is noteworthy, however, that sig-

82

nificantly higher social desirability scores were found in
the hypertension comparison group, not within the alcoholic
groups.

Thus, the use of this scale revealed more defen-

siveness (at least in terms of social desirability) in the
nonalcoholic comparison group.

Similar findings have been

reported by Selzer, Vinokur, and Wilson (1977), who found
that alcoholics in treatment were less defensive than either
alcoholics not in treatment or control subjects.
Two other variables significantly influenced the selfreport data: sensation seeking and life stress.

The effects

of these varaibles were more limited and somewhat reciprocal.

Sensation seeking was strongly associated with per-

sonal expectations of positive consequences of drinking,
including enhancement of feelings of sexuality, power,
social assertion, and relaxation.

Sensation seekers, then,

may be especially sensitive to alcohol as a source of reinforcing sensations-- in line with Galazio, Rosenthal and
Stein's (1983) conceptualization of sensation seeking as a
reflection of a distinct biological sensitivity to stimulation as reinforcement.

It has been suggested that sensation

seeking may be associated with a strong biological responsivity to alcohol, possibly even a biological predisposition
to addiction, for a certain subset of drinkers (Zuckerman,
1971; Galazio, Rosenthal & Stein, 1983; Brown & Munson,
1987). In this study, alcoholic subjects as a group did have
significantly higher sensation seeking scores, although the
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hypertensive subjects were also older, and sensation seeking has been shown to decline with age (Zuckerman, Eysenck,

& Eysenck, 1978).

Thus these data cannot really address the

question of the possible physiological underpinnings of
expectations of reinforcement from drinking, although this
area certainly warrants further study.
Life stress was also important in that subjects reporting more life change or stress anticipated significantly
more impairment and carelessness to result from their own
drinking, and significantly less pleasure for others who
drank.

Again, as a group the alcoholic subjects reported

significantly more life change than the comparison group,
similar to findings of Selzer et al.
al.

(1987).

(1977) and Rychtarik et

Entering treatment was undoubtedly a stressful

experience for many of the alcoholic subjects, and for many
was probably preceded by or concurrent with some kind of
family, work, or legal problems.

Layne (1983) and Krantz

(1985) have suggested that the experience of more negative
life events results in a less optimistic and more realistic
appraisal of the potential for future misfortune.

The

stresses associated with treatment may have sensitized some
alcoholic subjects to the adverse consequences of drinking.
However, the degree of any such sensitization was apparently
limited, since the alcoholics were still generally more positive than the nonalcoholics in their perceptions of the
consequences of drinking, and all subject groups, regard-
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less of life stressors, described themselves as less influenced by alcohol than others.

Perhaps the experience of

life stress at least allowed some alcoholics a more complex
or differentiated set of expectancies in relation to alcohol
consumption.
Overall, the variables of social desirability, sensation seeking, and life stress were particularly influential
in terms of the self-referent measures.

Social desirability

effects were not, as hypothesized, important for alcoholic
subjects but rather for the nonalcoholic subjects.

Gener-

ally, a socially desirable response style was associated
with less expression of concern about personal vulnerability.

Sensation seeking demonstrated a distinct association

with personal anticipation of positive feelings or sensations from drinking, whereas life stress was associated with
more anticipation of personal impairment or carelessness.
Utilization of a partialling technique proved valuable in
evaluating the relevance of these variables for the selfreport data.

More importantly, it allowed their effects to

be isolated from the subsequent tests of the variables of
interest.

With the covariates taken into account, the

strongest effects to emerge were those of depression and
self-other differences in appraisal of risk.

II. The Relevance of Depression
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In this study, it was hypothesized that level of
depression would prove to be significantly associated with
subjects' perceptions of vulnerability or health risk.

It

was also hypothesized that this association would be circumscribed to personal, rather than general expectations.

The

data did in fact yield strong support for these hypotheses.
Depression showed a significant main effect in relation to
evaluations of personal health risk and for several of the
AEQ subscales measuring expectations of personal consequences of drinking.

However, depression failed to show any

significant relationship with death attitudes, and only
interacted significantly with group membership in reference
to expectations of personal impairment from drinking.
Specifically, the data yielded strong support for the
hypothesis that depression would prove relevant for only
personal expectancies: there was a significant main effect
of depression for four of the ten self-referent but none of
the nine other-referent dependent variables.

Also, there

was an additional self-referent AEQ scale (anticipation of
relaxation) for which the effect of depression approached
significance

(i=

1.95,~<.10).

The effect of depression was

thus distinctly self-referent, as reported by Lewinsohn et
al.

(1982), Segal and Shaw (1986a), and Sweeney, Anderson,

and Bailey (1986),
Depression was associated with perceptions of greater
personal health risk and vulnerability to the effects of
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alcohol consumption.

The strongest main effect for depres-

sion was in terms of perceived general health risk, as measured by the FHI

(~=

3.77,

~<.001).

The positive rela-

tionship between BDI and FHI scores indicates that more
depressed subjects acknowledged significantly more potential
to experience personal illness or injury.

Because risk was

judged relative to that of one's peers, the significant
finding suggests that only depressed subjects did not demonstrate a systemmatic optimistic bias in judging their susceptibility to health problems.

In other words, the

depressed subjects were, as hypothesized, more realistic in
their appraisals of personal health risk.

These data sup-

port the hypothesis that depression is associated with more
realistic expectations and less self-enhancement in terms of
illusions of control and/or invulnerability, as reported by
Alloy and Abramson (1979), Layne (1983), Crocker, Kayne, and
Alloy (1985), Krantz (1985), and Pyszczynski, Holt, and
Greenberg (1987).
In fact, the pattern of main effects for depression in
association with the AEQ scales adds further support to the
suggestion that higher levels of depression are associated
with less illusion of personal invulnerability.

The more

depressed subjects in this study described themselves as
significantly more affected by alcohol than did the less
depressed subjects.

As hypothesized, depression was signi-

ficantly associated with the expectation of a negative con-
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sequence of drinking, i.e. that of impairment
~<.05).

(i= 2.05,

Again, this effect was self-referent, indicating

that only more depressed subjects consistently internalized
the potential vulnerability to some kind of harm from
drinking.

It is noteworthy, too, that the depressed sub-

jects' alcohol-related expectancies were not universally
negative.

More depressed subjects also anticipated signi-

ficantly more enhancement of sexual feelings
~<.05) and social assertion

(i= 2.03,

(i= 1.99,

~<.05) as a conse-

quence of their drinking, and their expectations of relaxation

(i= 1.95) approached significance as well.

Thus

depression did not serve to simply make subjects more
pessimistic or negative in their perceptions; rather, the
more depressed subjects described balanced expectations of
both positive and negative consequences of drinking.

In a

sense, more depressed subjects demonstrated the capacity to
see both sides of the coin, whereas less depressed subjects
denied being much affected in any way by drinking.

These

data correspond to the findings of Eaves and Rush (1984),
Krantz (1985), and Munoz and Lewinsohn (submitted for publication), all of whom noted that depression had less to do
with weakened positive expectancies than with stronger negative expectancies.
Holding simultaneous expectations of positive and
negative consequences of one's drinking could conceivably be
interpreted as indicative of disorganized or contradictory
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beliefs, in line with Eaves and Rush's (1984) and Cook and
Peterson's (1986) assertions that depression reflects illogical thought processes.

Such an interpretation, thou.gh,

would be predicated on the assumption that either alcohol
consumption does not have multiple effects, or that these
effects are mutually exclusive of each other.

Anyone who

has had the occasion to drink a little too much would almost
certainly refute these assumptions, since they have probably
experienced both desirable and undesirable consequences of
drinking.

Less colloquially, the studies by Southwick et

al. (1981), Rohsenow (1983), and Brown and Munson (1987)
have demonstrated drinkers' simultaneous expectations of
various effects from drinking.

By contrast, it is intrin-

sically contradictory for alcoholics in treatment to describe themselves as less affected by alcohol than others,
yet concurrently anticipate significantly more positive
consequences of drinking: such beliefs clearly reflect a
distorted and inconsistent view of reality.

However, to

acknowledge personal susceptibility to potential illness or
injury, and to simultaneously allow for the possibility of
experiencing both positive and negative effects from drinking, is an entirely consistent and even-handed appraisal of
one's vulnerability.

The current findings thus suggest that

a more realistic and less defensively biased appraisal is a
function of the level of depression.
Depression did not, however, show the hypothesized
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relationship to death attitudes, even when attitudes toward
personal death were differentiated from attitudes toward
others' deaths.

These data thus support the findings of

Lucas (1974) and Wagner and Lorion (1984), both of whom
reported a weak relationship between depression and death
anxiety.

In the context of this study, the lack of a sig-

nificant relationship between depression and evaluation of
personal death, especially given the significant association
between depression and evaluations of general health risk,
suggests that death attitudes are not a logical extension of
evaluations of personal vulnerability.

It is almost as if

the more depressed subjects were willing to acknowledge more
concern or worry about potential illness or impairment, but
not about their own deaths.

The subjects in this study

seemed to view death attitudes as unrelated to perceptions
of personal health.

Becker (1973) would view this distinc-

tion as indicative of the fundamental human need to isolate
and deny the reality of one's own mortality. The pattern of
results observed for the death attitude scales certainly
coincide with Becker's (1973) position.

Death attitude

scores were highly consistent across groups, as were the
significant self-other differences reported (cf. Table 4).
Apparently the reality of personal death is remote, even for
the less defensively biased depressed subjects.
The one significant interaction identified also suggests that depression is associated with less distortion of
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reality.

The degree of association between depression and

perception of personal impairment from drinking differed
significantly between the outpatient alcoholic and hypertensive groups

(~=

2.07,

~<.05).

As predicted, the overall

relationship between depression and perceptions of personal
impairment was positive: subjects acknowledging more depression also acknowledged more potential self-harm associated
with their behavior, consistent with the findings of Farbarow (1980) and Sweeney, Anderson, and Bailey (1986).

It is

noteworthy, though, that contrary to the hypotheses, the
outpatient alcoholics' perceptions of potential impairment
from drinking were

~

independent of their depression

scores, especially at lower levels of depression (Figures 1

& 2).

Several interpretations of these data are possible.
Figures 1 and 2 show relatively more scatter in

impairment scores at lower levels of depression.

It is pos-

sible that the brevity of the impairment subscale, consisting of only five items, created a ceiling effect.

The

overall distripution of impairment scores shows a preponderance of high impairment scores, especially for alcoholic
subjects, regardless of the level of depression.

If a

greater range of impairment scores were possible, there
might have been a clearer trend in the way in which the
alcoholic subjects' BDI and impairment scale scores covaried.

Relatedly, having relatively fewer subjects with high

depression scores, especially in the hypertension group,
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limits the confidence with which one can interpret the
interaction of scores in the higher ranges.

Thus the rela-

tively skewed distributions of scores, with generally high
impairment scores and generally low BDI scores, may limit
the meaningfulness of the interaction observed.
This limitation of the data notwithstanding, it
appears that alcoholics' expectations of alcohol-related
impairment are less closely associated with their degree of
depression than are such expectations of nonalcoholics.
This could be a reflection of the poorer integration or
ordination of constructs identified among substance abusers
and more maladjusted people (Farbarow, 1980; Angellilo et
al., 1985).

If so, this would imply that denial involves

the process more than the content of alcoholics' cognitions.
Less depressed alcoholics seem to show less coherent organization of their experiences, rather than inaccurate perceptions per se (Alloy & Abramson, 1979; Farbarow, 1980).

In

fact, the interaction of scores among more depressed alcoholics more closely resembled the pattern of scores among
the more depressed nonalcoholics-- in other words, alcoholic
subjects were more consistent and more like nonalcoholic
subjects at moderate to high levels of depression.

Experi-

encing moderate levels of depression, then, may be adaptive
for alcoholic subjects, at least to the extent that it is
associated with a more realistic and integrated organization
of personal experience.

This interpretation is consistent
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with Gibson and Becker's (1973a) report that the cognitive
organization of depressed alcoholics paralleled that of
depressed nonalcoholics, and the conclusion of numerous
researchers that depression is associated with being less
defensively biased regarding the possibility of negative
personal experiences (Layne, 1983; Krantz, 1985; Crocker,
Kayne, & Alloy, 1985).

Again, though, given the skewed

distribution of scores involved, some replication of this
finding would prove valuable.
In point of fact, the effects of depression identified
are particularly noteworthy given the positively skewed distribution of BDI scores (Table 1).

In general, depression

scores were relatively low, with outpatient alcoholic,
aftercare, and hypertension group mean scores of, respectively, 13.6, 11, and 9.3 (see Table 2).

There was no sig-

nificant difference between the group means, although the
two alcoholic groups had a broader range of scores, i.e.
scores up to 36 and 32 for the outpatient and aftercare
groups, compared to a high of 26 for the nonalcoholic group.
The depression scores observed in the alcoholic subjects in
this study are comparable to the mean BDI score of 13.8
reported by Beck, Steer, and McElroy (1982) but are somewhat
lower than those reported by Petty and Nasrullah (1981), who
found scores above 18 for almost 40% of their sample.
Hesselbrock et al.

Also,

(1983) reported that over half of their

inpatient alcoholic sample had scores over 13 on the BDI.
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The slightly higher BDI scores of alcoholic subjects beginning treatment are consistent with the observations of Gibson and Becker (1973) and Petty and Nasrullah (1981), that
depression levels tend to decrease across the course of
treatment.

Thus, the alcoholic subjects in this study

reported fewer incidences of more severe depression than
would be expected based on previous findings.
It is possible that the more depressed alcoholic subjects in treatment were underrepresented in this sample,
because participation was strictly voluntary and involved a
full half hour of completing measures.

Cooperation required

a fair amount of effort, even by the standards of less
depressed individuals.

The task involved may thus have sel-

ected against more depressed subjects (almost 30% refused to
participate in the study).

It is possible that with a ful-

ler distribution of depression scores, stronger main effects
for depression would have been identified.

However, even

with the limitations of the BDI scores obtained, depression
proved to be a significant intervening variable in alcoholic
perceptions of personal risk.
In sum, these data lend strong support to most of the
hypotheses concerning depression.
depression were observed only for

First, main effects for
self~referent

measures, in

support of the self-schema theories of depression (Beck et
al., 1979; Lewinsohn et al., 1982; Segal & Shaw, 1986; Pyszczynski, Holt, & Greenberg, 1987).

Secondly, the pattern of
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main effects of depression indicated that depressed subjects
acknowledged more vulnerability to illness and impairment,
and to the effects of drinking, consistent with the hypothesis that depression is associated with less illusion of control over the environment, as described by Alloy and Abramson (1979), Layne (1983), Krantz (1985), and Crocker, Kayne,
and Alloy (1985).

This hypothesis of depressive realism is

further supported by the fact that the more depressed subjects in this study were not strictly more negative or pessimistic, and by the observation that at higher levels of
depression the cognitive organization of the alcoholic subjects was more consistent and more like that of nonalcoholic subjects.

In general, the effects of depression were

highly comparable across groups, although depression had to
reach moderately high levels before it proved relevant for
alcoholics' expectations of alcohol-related impairment.
Taken together, these data suggest that a moderate level of
depression is adaptive for an alcoholic, because it is associated with a more consistent appraisal of personal vulnerability than is evidenced by less depressed alcoholics.

III. Evaluations of Personal Risk

This study sought to relate the importance of selfother distinctions in appraisals of health risk to a population engaging in the health-threatening behavior of
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alcohol abuse (Farbarow, 1980; Perloff & Fetzer, 1986).

It

was hypothesized that all subjects would differentiate
between personal and more general expectations of risk, and
that depression would prove relevant only in terms of personal expectations.
these hypotheses.

The data yielded strong support for
It was also hypothesized that alcoholic

subjects would show greater self-other differences in their
evaluations than would nonalcoholic subjects, but there was
a failure to support this hypothesized interaction.
As hypothesized, all subjects tended to minimize their
concerns or perceptions of personal vulnerability to illness, impairment, or death relative to their perceptions of
others' risks.

This bias toward perceiving less-than-aver-

age risk did not reach significance in relation to views of
general health problems, as measured by the Future Health
Inventory (FHI).

However, this bias was statistically sig-

nificant for all of the AEQ subscales, measuring expected
consequences of alcohol consumption, and for the death attitude scales.
The consistency and relative strength of the selfother differences in AEQ scores suggest a distinct bias specific to expectations of the effects of alcohol.

Weinstein

(1980, 1984) found that one of the strongest biases of
undergraduate subjects was in terms of perceived invulnerability to alcohol-related problems.

In this case clinical

subjects, including two groups of alcoholics in treatment,
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still described themselves as less affected by alcohol than
people in general, for every one of the AEQ subscales.
Alcoholic and nonalcoholic drinkers alike have demonstrated
a distinct tendency to perceive themselves as less influenced by alcohol than others (Selzer et al., 1977; Southwick et al., 1981; Rohsenow, 1983).

Perloff and Fetzer's

(1986) ''ego-defensive downward comparisons" theory can be
used to interpret the strength of this bias in relation to
alcohol.

According to Perloff and Fetzer (1986), a person

will, when given the opportunity, assess his own risk for a
particular misfortune by selecting a more at-risk person as
a basis for comparison.

Typically, to the extent that this

comparison target is not someone specific or close to oneself, one is able to admit to the reality of negative events
occurring, but lessen one's anxiety by focusing on others
more at risk than oneself.

Alcoholism lends itself to such

stereotyping, and the image of a skid row bum clutching a
bottle in a brown paper bag is a fairly popular and extreme
stereotype that for most people would create a strong (and
comfortable) perception of distance between themselves and
the "typical" alcoholic.

Such an unappealing image of the

kind of person who is affected by their drinking would certainly be inconsistent with most people's self images and
would thus reinforce minimizing personal vulnerability to
alcohol consumption.
Aside from the stigma associated with popular cultural
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images of the alcoholic, there may also be a distinct pharmacological effect of alcohol consumption that heightens
self-other discrepencies in perceptions of vulnerability.
Hull's (1981) self-awareness model of alcohol consumption
posits that one action of alcohol on the brain is to disrupt
the encoding of self-relevant information.

In essence,

drinking may reinforce a lack of internalization of experiences involving alcohol use by interference, on a physiological level, with the brain's ability to encode information into coherent self-schema.

Alcoholic subjects, then,

may describe themselves as less affected by drinking than
people in general because their ingestion of alcohol inhibited internalization of their drinking experiences.
The other area of significant self-other differences
was in relation to attitudes toward death.

As hypothesized,

all subjects described significantly less concern or worry
about their own deaths than the deaths of others.

However,

scores between groups were highly comparable, indicating
that alcoholics did not show a greater discrepency in death
attitudes than did nonalcoholics, contrary to the hypotheses.

Becker (1973) would conceptualize the lack of worry

subjects expressed about personal death as a "normal" form
of denial.

He described "organismic narcissism" as the crux

of the human condition: this narcissism is that no one
believes that they themselves will die.

According to Kier-

kegaard, the paradox of being part animal, part symbolic is
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an awful and overwhelming apprehension for most people, who
in turn respond by repressing their anxieties about their
mortality and tranquilizing themselves with trivial preoccupations (Becker, 1973).

Anxiety is contained, but at the

cost of distorted perceptions of reality and a more restricted lifestyle.
While the alcoholic subjects' minimalization of concern regarding their own deaths was no more extreme, the
associated distortion of reality could have more serious
implications. As Becker (1973) observes, fear of death is
adaptive, as it orients an individual toward self-preservation: "Early men who were most afraid •.. about their place
in nature •.. passed on to their offspring a realism that had
high survival value" (p. 17).

Farbarow (1980) too notes

that alcoholics, engaging in a form of indirect self-destructive behavior, do not recognize their behavior as realistically resulting in self-injury.

Farbarow (1980) sug-

gests that alcoholic risk-taking generates an unrealistic
sense of power and control over the environment.

Schwebal

and Kaemmerer (1977) relate this same issue of control to
smokers' general fatalism regarding having control over
their deaths, and thus unrealistically perceiving the consequences of smoking as more or less irrelevant in terms of
their life expectancy.

Thus the relative lack of concern

expressed by all subjects over personal death may reflect an
innate human tendency to deny, or at least minimize, the
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anxiety and powerlessness felt in relation to personal mortality.

The significantly greater worry expressed for the

deaths of loved ones would then reflect a stronger sense of
reality about others' eventual deaths.
The only measure not yielding a significant self-other
difference in perception of risk was the FHI.

A trend in

the hypothesized direction was observed, but its failure to
reach significance was probably due to the extreme variance
in scores (SD= 16.59).

It may also be a function of the

directions given to the subjects to assess their risks relative to those of other men their age-- a fairly specific
comparison target.

While the FHI's comparison target was

specifically a peer figure, the "other" version of the AEQ
asked for an evaluation of the consequences of drinking for
"people in general," thus allowing some latitude in terms of
the comparison target chosen.

Perloff and Fetzer's (1986)

theory would predict greater self-other discrepencies under
the less directive conditions of the AEQ instructions, as
was the case in this instance,
Only one significant group difference in degree of
self-other discrepency was identified.

The outpatient alco-

holic group showed significantly less self-other discrepency
than the hypertensive comparison group in terms of expectation of alcohol-induced impairment (E= 3.37, p<.01).

Con-

trary to the hypotheses, the outpatient alcoholics anticipated as much impairment from drinking as others, whereas
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alcoholics in aftercare expected others to be somewhat more
impaired, and hypertensive subjects expected others to be
quite a bit more impaired.

These results might reflect the

immediacy of experiences with impairment from drinking: many
outpatient alcoholics, beginning treatment, were probably
involved in recent or ongoing problems associated with their
drinking, whereas aftercare patients had several months of
treatment behind them, and the nonabusive drinkers probably
had had fewer experiences of alcohol-related impairment.
Because the AA model of treatment specifically focuses first
and foremost on admitting to be powerless over (i.e. vulnerable to) alcohol, participation in the treatment program
may well diminish feelings of invulnerability.

Alcohol

abusers not in treatment might have shown a more pronounced
bias in terms of perceived personal invulnerability.
The general failure to find group differences in the
degree of self-other discrepency may, then, be in part a
function of the alcoholic subjects' participation in a
treatment program that emphasizes personal vulnerability to
the effects of alcohol.

The comparability of the groups in

terms of self-other death attitudes indicates that alcoholic
subjects were not engaging in more extreme denial of negative views about their mortality.

Perhaps there is no need

for greater denial, if the substance abuse is perceived as
irrelevant to ultimate mortality risk (Schwebal & Kaemmerer,
1977; Farbarow, 1980).

Or perhaps acknowledging vulnerabil-
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ity to alcohol modifies an alcoholic's broader sense of vulnerabilities, bringing his perceptions of his mortality more
into line with the more "normal'' death attitudes of nonalcoholics.
This second suggestion fits the information processing
framework described by Guidano and Liotti (1983), who emphasize that one's self-concept is at the center of all knowledge, and any change in attitudes toward oneself necessarily modifies one's attitude toward reality.

In other words,

self-knowledge is distinct from more general knowledge, yet
the content and the organization of the self-concept direct
how we interact with our environment, and how we assimilate
our experiences.

Thus if the self-concept is modified to

incorporate the quality of I-can-be-affected-by-alcohol,
then there will be some reorganization of related beliefs,
attributions, and values that will in turn influence the
behaviors that emerge as an extension of the new self-evaluation.

Now poor job performance can be attributed to.

impairment from a hangover, so the pattern of drinking may
change.

Assimilation of these new experiences may in turn

revise related beliefs, e.g. about how much control you have
in your life, or on a deeper level your evaluation of the
kind of person you are, either or both of which have implications for your attitudes toward your death.
Overall, the consistency of the self-other discrepencies and the lack of significant group differences in the
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form or degree of these discrepencies suggest that seeing
oneself as distinct from others is a very fundamental tendency in human beings.

Guidano and Liotti (1983) theorize

that self-knowledge is processed in a qualitatively different manner than general knowledge, and the results of this
study and those of Kuiper and Rogers (1979) and Pyszczynski,
Holt, and Greenberg (1987) support Guidano and Liotti's
(1983) model.

Similarly, Becker's (1973) description of the

universal denial or minimalization of distress over personal
mortality is supported by the current findings and receives
some convergent validation from the finding that people consistently differentiate between attitudes toward personal
death and more general attitudes toward death (Durlak & Kasimatis, in press).

Apparently it is inevitable that each

person is the center of their experience, and the distinctions they make between themselves and others profoundly
affect their expectations, attributions, and other cognitive processes that mediate their sense of reality.

IV. Characteristic Cognitions of Alcoholics

The pattern of main effects of group membership indicate that alcoholics and nonalcoholics differed most in
terms of their expectations of reinforcement from alcohol.
The lack of any significant differences between the outpatient and aftercare alcoholic groups suggests that regard-
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less of the point in treatment, the alcoholic subjects were
still more like each other than like the nonalcoholic comparison group, a finding also reported by Woodruff et al.
(1973b).

This similarity is further supported by the numer-

ous effects for group membership identified in comparisons
of each of the alcoholic groups with the hypertensive group
(see Table 4).
In terms of the specific hypotheses, there was a failure to support the hypothesized group differences in terms
of evaluations of general health risks or personal death.
All subjects showed some tendency to minimize their general
health risks, but this tendency was not statistically significant and was not, as hypothesized, more pronounced among
alcoholic subjects.

Similarly, while all subjects reported

significantly fewer negative attitudes toward their own
deaths than toward the deaths of others, there were no significant differences between the groups themselves.

Per-

haps, as was suggested before, the abuse of alcohol was not
perceived by alcoholic subjects as having any particular
ramifications in terms of their illness or mortality, and as
such there was no need for a more extreme bias in perceptions of personal vulnerability.
However, the data yielded fairly strong support for
the hypothesized differences between alcoholic and nonalcoholic subjects in terms of their expectations of the consequences of alcohol consumption.

Both alcoholic groups held
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significantly more positive expectations of reinforcement
from drinking, particularly for themselves but also to a
lesser degree for others.

Thus these differences were.not,

as hypothesized, limited to personal expectations, although
there were more significant differences in personal expectancies than in general expectancies.

Also, contrary to the

hypotheses, the minimalization of the potential impairment
from drinking referred to drinkers in general, rather than
personal impairment.

These results are consistent with the

findings of Southwick et al.

(1981), Rohsenow (1983), and

Brown, Creamer, and Stetson (1987), all of whom reported
that alcohol abusers are consistently more oriented toward
the potential positive effects of drinking.

In each of

these studies, heavier drinkers differed from nonabusing
drinkers in expecting significantly more positive consequences from alcohol consumption, while not differing in
expectations of negative consequences.

Also, the relative

strength of the alcoholics' expectancies support Brown,
Goldman, and Christianson's (1985) and Brown and Munson's
(1987) findings that stronger alcohol expectancies are associated with heavier drinking, for alcoholic and nonalcoholic
drinkers.
In this study the alcoholic subjects evidenced a somewhat contradictory but stronger bias in reference to perceptions of alcohol consumption than did the nonalcoholic comparison group.

All subjects evaluated themselves as less
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affected by alcohol than others, but the alcoholic subjects
simultaneously held significantly stronger expectations of
positive reinforcement from drinking, moreso for themselves
but also for others.

And, despite the fact that most of the

alcoholic subjects had certainly experienced some kind of
alcohol-related problems or impairment in recent months,
they still did not differ from the nonalcoholic subjects in
their anticipation of the potential negative consequences of
drinking, and even described significantly less impairment
associated with drinking in general.
It is interesting that the support for the hypothesized bias was circumscribed to expectations of reinforcement from alcohol in particular, and did not generalize to
broader concerns about health and mortality.

In a sense,

alcoholics were no different from nonalcoholics except in
terms of their perceptions of the effects of alcohol itself.
Their expectations about alcohol were more powerful and more
inconsistent.

The cognitive differences noted could be

interpreted as a function of the characteristics of alcoholics in particular, or the characteristics of a broader population of addicted or maladjusted people.
Alcoholics characteristically find feelings of vulnerability to be ego-dystonic, according to Farbarow (1980).
Traits of dependency and anxiety, and issues of control are
commonly identified as part of the "alcoholic personality,"
and are clearly relevant to perceptions of vulnerability and
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to the problems of depression and low self-esteem so frequently observed in alcoholics (Weissman et al., 1977; Farbarow, 1980; Brown & Munson, 1987; Holden, 1987).

The· data

reflect the types of reinforcements anticipated by the alcoholic subjects: to feel more powerful and assertive, more
relaxed and comfortable.

All suggest a possible constella-

tion of issues and feelings related to vulnerability and
control that could be considered "typically alcoholic."
The current data suggest that these control issues
tend to be highly focused, almost exclusively, on control in
relation to alcohol use.

Perhaps the alcoholic's preoccupa-

tion with the control over drinking is a metaphor for (and
distraction from) concerns about control or efficacy in
other areas of his life.

Worrying about how much and how

well you can drink would be, in Becker's (1973) framework, a
trivial and literally tranquilizing distraction from more
overwhelming anxiety about the limited control that you have
over your life and death.

Alcohol's actual pharmacological

effects may also reinforce drinking as a response to anxiety
and feelings of vulnerability by influencing how information
regarding personal experiences with alcohol is encoded and
assimilated (Hull, 1986).

Smart (1968) even suggests that

alcohol use seems to diminish the coherence of ordering of
personal future time perspective in alcoholics.

In other

words, the effect of alcohol on the brain seems to contribute to the development of contradictory expectations of the
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consequences of personal alcohol use, both in reference to
the present and the future.
Thus the group differences observed can be interpreted
as a function of personality dynamics characteristic of
alcoholics, reinforced by the pharmacological action of
alcohol.

However, while the "alcoholic" traits discussed

previously can be plausibly related to perceptions of vulnerability and cognitive disorganization, most are not
exclusive to the disorder of alcoholism.

Depression, anxi-

ety, and low self-esteem are also symptommatic of a number
of other psychological disorders and have been shown to
adversely affect cognitive consistency and feelings of control or power (Beck, 1967; McAllister, 1981; Martin, Ward &
Clark, 1983; Eaves & Rush, 1984; Cook & Peterson, 1986).
The distortion or incoherence of the alcoholic subjects'
expectations of reinforcement from alcohol may not be unique
to alcoholism per se, so much as the broader dynamics of
either addiction or general maladjustment.
The hypotheses regarding the main effects of alcoholism in this study were based on the results of studies not
only of alcoholics, but of smokers and drug abusers as well.
The results of this study could alternately be interpreted
in the context of an addictive, rather than an alcoholic,
personality.

The logic of Fishbein's (1977) model of inter-

nalization of risk, based on his literature review of smokers' beliefs, certainly seems applicable to the interpre-
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tation of results from studies of alcohol abuse, such as
those of Rohsenow (1983) or Brown, Creamer, & Stetson
(1987).

In fact, Marlatt's (1978) "abstinence

violati~n

effect" concept, again developed to describe relapses in
smoking cessation, has been employed by Cooney et al. (1987)
to explain cognitive and affective changes in alcoholic and
nonalcoholic drinkers.

And Eiser and Harding (1983) found

that beliefs about smoking were differentially related to
beliefs about drinking.

Patterns of beliefs about substance

abuse seem to cut across the specific form of addiction.
The relative inconsistency of the alcoholic's expectations can also be understood as a function of general maladjustment.

The alcoholic subjects had not meaningfully inte-

grated their beliefs: their perceptions of how they were
affected by alcohol were contradictory, and apparently isolated from what would logically be related areas of concern,
i.e. general health and mortality risk.

In a sense, the

alcoholics' beliefs about their alcohol abuse comprised an
encapsulated area of cognitive disorganization.
et al.

Angellilo

(1985) found low ordination or organization of con-

structs to be a correlate of general psychological maladaption, regardless of the particular type of pathology manifested.

It was the degree of organization of constructs,

rather than their actual content, that distinguished psychiatric subjects from the normal controls (Angellilo et al.,
1985).
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Similarly, Guidano and Liotti's (1983) model of cognitive processes posits that emotional disorders are associated with the distortion and lack of assimilation of reality.

Guidano and Liotti (1983) suggest that our behavior is

organized around our need to confirm and maintain a stable
sense of personal identity.

To the extent that a person's

self-image is contradictory or threatened by disconfirming
experiences that threaten self-esteem, a ''protective belt"
or defensive shell excludes or distorts the new information
in an attempt to preserve a stable sense of self (and thus
reality).

As a result, experiences are not coherently

assimilated, and the individual's interaction with reality
becomes increasingly rigid and stereotypic in order to protect the threatened self-concept.

For this study, then, the

alcoholics' contradictory evaluation of personal vulnerability to alcohol could be expected to stimulate a defensive
response to experiences that challenge perceptions of invulnerability, resulting in both a less coherent organization
of expectations, and behaviors reflecting more distorted and
defensive attitudes toward reality.
In summary, then, there was mixed support for the
hypothesized group effects.

The two alcoholic groups were

found to be quite similar to each other, and each demonstrated significant cognitive differences in comparison to the
nonalcoholic group.

Contrary to the hypotheses, alcoholic

subjects did not differ from nonalcoholic subjects in atti-
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tudes toward general health or death, although they did have
significantly different expectations of reinforcement from
alcohol.

While these main effects were not, as hypothe-

sized, limited only to personal experience, there were more
significant differences in personal, rather than general,
expectations.

Overall, alcoholic subjects held signifi-

cantly more positive expectations regarding personal alcohol consumption, and more positive and less negative perceptions of drinking in general.

Given their concurrent

perception of being less affected by alcohol than are
others, the alcoholics demonstrated a somewhat inconsistent
and disorganized set of cognitions related to their alcohol
abuse.

Without a psychiatric control group, this cognitive

disorganization could be variously interpreted as characteristic of alcoholism, addiction, or general maladjustment.

V. Summary and Conclusions

The purpose of this study was to examine alcoholics'
perceptions of the consequences of their alcohol abuse-- in
particular, their subjective appraisals of risk of illness,
impairment, and death.

It was hypothesized that all sub-

jects would describe significantly different evaluations of
personal vulnerability, depending upon their degree of
depression, and that the differences among alcoholics would
be more extreme than those of nonalcoholics.

Denial was
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conceptualized as a failure to meaningfully incorporate, as
personally relevant, more general knowledge of the potential
risks associated with one's behavior.

In contrast, the cog-

nitive aspect of depression emphasized involved the more
negative but realistic appraisal of personal vulnerability
to misfortune.

The outcome of this study was consistent

with most of these formulations.
Most notably, what emerged was a type of counterpoint
between denial and depression.

As hypothesized, the two

showed an antagonistic relationship in reference to perceptions of personal vulnerability.

Higher levels of depres-

sion were significantly associated with acknowledging more
vulnerability to general health risks, and to the effects
(both positive and negative) of alcohol consumption.

Thus

the depressed subjects demonstrated a somewhat more negative
but generally more balanced and integrated self-assessment,
which in turn implies a less distorted view of reality.

It

should be noted, however, that this trend was evidenced
across low-to-moderate levels of depression, and as such
cannot necessarily be extrapolated to more severely
depressed subjects.
Another clear pattern that emerged was that of the
seemingly innate tendency to differentiate between evaluations of oneself and of others.

All subjects consistently

minimized their concerns about themselves relative to the
risks they perceived for others.

Subjects were more nega-
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tive in their evaluations of others' deaths, and others'
susceptibility to the effects of alcohol.

These differences

do suggest that humans are inherently self-centered: not
only are self-schema the reference point for each person's
construction of reality, but they are "normally" biased
toward self-evaluations of being uniquely lucky or invulnerable.

Depression, again at less severe levels, appears to

involve not so much a pathological pessimism as a loss of
potentially pathological optimism.
Why qualify optimism as "potentially" pathological?
There are indications that some denial of worry can be adaptive.

Some optimistic bias in personal expectancies may

sustain motivation for problem-solving (Weinstein, 1982;
Layne, 1983; Segal & Shaw, 1984).

Denial of anxiety before

serious operations is associated with fewer post-operative
complications and speedier discharge (Goleman, 1987).

There

is, however, an obvious caveat: while self-deception may be
adaptive in situations in which you cannot change the threat
at hand, it is clearly maladaptive if it results in not responding to important symptoms or cues of manageable risks
(Weinstein, 1982; Goleman, 1987).

In the context of this

study, the consistency with which less depressed subjects
described themselves as less affected by alcohol than others
is remarkable, particularly since two-thirds of the subjects
were in treatment for alcohol abuse.

Considering that the

cognitive organization of the more depressed alcoholics more
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closely resembled that of the nonalcoholic subjects, it is
not surprising that Holden (1987) reports that a diagnosis
of depression in an alcoholic patient is associated with
improved benefit from treatment.

Alcoholics appear to be

better served by a little depression than a little denial.
Thus it does seem to be useful to consider alcoholics
as a heterogeneous population, and to consider depression as
one meaningful parameter for distinguishing subgroups (Selzer, Winokur, & Wilson, 1977; Holden, 1987).

In this study,

more depressed subjects' self-evaluations were significantly
different from those of less depressed subjects.

In con-

trast, no significant differences were found between alcoholics beginning and ending treatment-- a somewhat discouraging finding as far as the impact of the program.

There

was no evidence that the treatment program, based on widely
accepted A.A. principles, had significantly changed the
alcoholics' perceptions of personal vulnerability or their
expectations of reinforcement from alcohol.

There was also

a failure to demonstrate the hypothesized interaction
between alcoholism and depression.

While there were a

number of simple group differences between alcoholic and
nonalcoholic subjects, these did not significantly interact
with level of depression as predicted.

Alcoholic subjects'

biases, positive and negative, were not more extreme, and in
one instance were significantly less distinct than those of
nonalcoholic subjects.

Depression was, in a sense, the
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great equalizer, having approximately the same effect for
each group and lessening the differences between groups.
The one other area of unsupported hypotheses in ·this
study was that of the death attitudes.

Attitudes toward

death, whether personal or of others, were originally conceptualized as logical extensions of appraisals of risk of
illness and impairment.

This did not prove to be the case.

The hypothesized significant self-other difference was
found, but otherwise death attitude scores were consistent
across groups and levels of depression.

Death attitudes

appear to be independent, if not encapsulated, from perceived risks of illness or impairment.

Even depressed sub-

jects, who acknowledged more personal vulnerability, did not
seem to include death along a continuum of potential harm.
Becker (1973) may be right: mortality may hold a uniquely
isolated and defended position in the human psyche.
What are the implications of these data for treatment?
It may be necessary to induce, or at least not counter, a
moderate level of depression in an alcoholic patient.

Mod-

erate depression may be indicative of less denial and more
internalization of the real consequences of alcohol abuse.
Rather than aiming interventions at lessening depression, it
may be a more therapeutic strategy to work at tolerating
depression and anxiety-- in essence, an ego-strengthening
approach.

Since alcoholics' time perspectives are hazy, and

the reality of potential self-destruction seems remote, an
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emphasis on long range consequences may be less effective
(Smart, 1968).

Instead, what would be indicated would be a

focus on integration of perceptions of the more immediate
personal consequences of alcohol abuse, which would, in
turn, require modification of the alcoholic patient's contradictory self-image in reference to issues of vulnerability and control.

These two levels of intervention could be

conceptualized as Guidano and Liotti's (1983) levels of peripheral and deep change.
The prevailing model for intervention, Alcoholics
Anonymous, is not entirely inconsistent with these formulations.

A.A. emphasizes personal vulnerability, both in its

"first step" (i.e. admitting powerlessness over alcohol) and
in its requirement of introducing oneself as an alcoholic
("I'm Mike and I'm an alcoholic"), A.A.'s concept of "hitting bottom" endorses the potential value of experiencing
depression. The "one day at a time" slogan is a validation
of the depressive's world view that life is hard.
though, A.A. is not a miracle cure.

Clearly,

While recidivism rates

are difficult to establish, conservative estimates place
attrition from treatment at over 50% (Holden, 1987).

In

this study, the lack of significant differences in the cognitions of alcoholics beginning and completing treatment
raises a serious question as to whether any significant cognitive change had taken place.

And even when A.A. interven-

tions prove successful, it is often not without costs.

A.A.
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fosters a certain amount of social segregation and a continued, albeit modified, preoccupation with alcohol.

A.A. also

requires more or less unquestioning adherence to its ideology, and is thus often antagonistic to more psychologically
minded approaches to treatment.
Probably A.A.'s main weakness is its view that there
is one kind of alcoholism and one form of treatment for it.
While there is not yet a great deal of information on the
role of cognitions in substance abuse, there is a growing
recognition of the potential value of cognitive interventions in tailoring treatment to particular patient characteristics (Gossop, Eiser, & Ward, 1982; Cooney et al., 1987;
Curry, Marlatt, & Gordon, 1987; Holden, 1987).

Pre-exist-

ing health beliefs have been shown to influence reponsiveness to different modalities of treatment for smokers (Eiser
et al., 1985; Kaufert et al., 1986).

Controlled drinking

may be a viable goal for some but not all alcoholics (Holden, 1987; Rychtarik et al., 1987).
While such a treatment goal is incompatible with the
A.A. model of alcoholism, other psychological interventions
could prove to be useful supplements to (or replacements
for) A.A.'s methods.

Cognitive restructuring techniques

could be employed to promote a more differentiated and integrated self-concept of being strong yet not invulnerable.
Role-playing and other problem-solving techniques would contribute further to ego-strengthening (Curry, Marlatt, & Gor-
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don, 1987).

Cognitive rehearsal is being targeted for

relapse prevention (Cooney et al., 1987).

The trend is

toward recognizing the heterogeneity of substance abusers,
and identifying the distinct patient needs or characteristics that will predict benefit from a particular treatment
modality.

The results of this study suggest that level of

depression and expectations regarding the consequences of
drinking are characteristics that warrent further study.
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DEMOGRAPHIC INFO
Please remember that your answers are confidential and in no way affect your
treatment eliiibility. We are interested in the general characteristics of
the entire ~of research subjects.
Year of Birth:
Race: __Black __Caucasian __ Hispanic __ Native .\merican
Marital Status:_Single

_~Iarried

__Other

_Separated _Widoi.;ed _Divorced

Educational Status: (circle one number)
Years of high school completed:
l 2 3

4

Years of college completed:

4

2

3

Do you have a completed graduate degree?

Yes

No

Employment Status:
working fulltime -_ _working part time __ retired
__unemployed or layed off
What kind of work do you do?
Job Title: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Financial Status:(current annual net income) __0-10,000 __ 11-20,000
__ 21-30,000 __ 31-40,000 __more than 40,000
Health Status: Do you have hypertension (high blood pressure)? _Yes _No
Are you (or have you ever been) in treatment for hypertension? __Yes __ No
List any medication you are taking for hypertension:
Do you have an alcohol abuse problem? __Yes __No
Are you lor have you ever been) in treatment for alcoholism? __Yes __No
Are you in treatment for alcoholism because of a court order? __Yes __No
List any medications you are taking as part of treatment for alcoholism:
Do you have any other health problems? __Yes __ No
If so, please list:
List any other prescription medications you take:
To what extent has your lifestyle changed in the last year:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
extreme
no
moderate
changes
changes
chanaes
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ATTITUDE QUESTIONNAIRE
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and
traits.
Read each item and decide whether the statement is true or false as
it pertains to you personally.

T

F

It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am
not encouraged.

T

F

I sometimes feel resentful when I don't get my way.

T

F

On a fe~ occas1ons, I have given up doing something because
I thought too littie of my ability.

T

F

There have been times when I felt like rebelling against
people in authority even though I knew they were right.

T

F

No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a 1ood listener.

T

F

There have been occasions when I took advanta1e of someone.

T

F

I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake.

T

F

I sometimes try to get even rather than for1ive and foraet.

T

.F

I am always courteous, even to people who are disaareeable.

T

F

I have never been an1ry when people expresaed ideas very
different from my own.

T

F

There have been times when I have been quite jealous of the
1ood fortune of others.

T

F

I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me.

T

F

I have never deliberately said somethina that hurt someone's
feelin1s.
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Interest and Preference Test
Each of the items below contains two choices, A and B.
Please circle the
letter of the choice that most describes your likes or the way you feel.
In
some cases you may find items in which both choices describe your likes and
feelings.
Please choose the one which better describes your likes and
feelings.
If you do not like either choice, mark the choice you dislike
least. Select only one choice, and do not leave any items blank. ~e are
interested only in your likes or feelings, not in how others feel about
these things or how one is supposed to feel.
There are no right or wron~
answers.
Be frank and give your honest appraisal of yourself.
1.

A. I like wild "un1nhib1 ted" parties.
B. I prefer quiet parties ~ith good conversation.

2.

A. There are some mo\ies that I enjoy seeing a second or even a third
time.
B. I can't stand watching a movie that I've seen before.

3.

A. I often wish I could be a mountain climber.
B. I can't understand people who risk their necks climbing mountains.

4.

A. I dislike all body odors.
B. I

5.

like some of the earthy body smells.

A. I aet bored seeing the same old faces.
B. I like the comfortable familiarity of everyday friends.

6.

A. I like to explore a stranae city or section of town myself, even if
it means getting lost.
B. I prefer a guide when I am in a place I don't know well.

7.

A. I dislike people who do or say things just to shock or upset others.
B. When you can predict almost everything a person will do and say, he
or she must be a bore.

8.

A. I usually don't enjoy a movie or a play where I can predict what will
happen in advance.
B. I don't mind watching a movie or play where I can predict what will
happen in advance.

9.

A. I have tried marijuana or would like to.
B. I would never saoke marijuana.

10. A. I would not like to try any drug which might produce strange and
dangerous effects on me.
B. I would like to try some of the new drugs that produce hallucinations.
11. A. A sensible person avoids activities that are danaerous.
B. I sometimes like to do thinis that are a little friahtening.

12. A. I dislike "swinaers".
B. I enjoy the company of real "swingers",
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13. A. I find that stimulants make me uncomfortable.
B. I often like to get high (drinking liquor or smoking marijuana).
14. A. I order the dishes "'ith which I am familiar, so as to avoid disappointment and unpleasantness.
B. I like to try new foods that I have never tasted before.
15. A. I enjoy looking at home movies or travel slides.
B. Looking at someone's home movies or travel slides bpres me tremendously.
16. A.

I

would like to take up the sport of "'ater skiing.
U!J i..-ater skiing.

B. I would not like to take
l i. A.

I

would like to

t ,.,.
J

...

••

surfboard riding.

B. I would not like to try surfboard riding.
18. A. When I go on a trip I like to plan my route and timetable fairly
carefully.
B. I would like to take off on a trip with no preplanned or definite
routes or timetables.
19. A. I prefer the "down to earth" kinds of people as friends.
B. I would like to make friends in some of the "far out" groups like
artists or "hippies".
20. A. I would not like to learn to fly an airplane.
B. I would like to learn to fly an airplane.
21. A. I prefer the surface of the water to the depths.
B. I would like to go scuba diving.
22. A. I would like to meet some persons who are homosexual (men or women).
B. I stay away from anyone I suspect of being "queer".
23. A. I would like to try parachute jumping.
B. I would never want to try jumping out of a plane, with or without
a parachute.
24. A. I prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable.
B. I prefer friends who are reliable and predictable.
25. A. I am not interested in experience for its own sake.
B. I like to have new and exciting experiences and sensations, even
if they are a little frightening, unconventional or illegal.
26. A. The essence of good art is in its clarity, sy1111111etry of form, and
harmony of colors.
B. I often find beauty in the "clashing" colors and irregular form
of modern paintings.
27. A. I enjoy spending time in the familiar surroundings of home.
B. I get very restless if I have to stay around home for any length of
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time.
28. A. I like to dive off the high board.
B. I don't like the feeling I get standing on the high board (or I don't
go near it at all).
I like to date members of the opposite sex who are physically
exciting.
B. I like to date members of the opposite sex who share my values.

29. A.

30. A. Heavy drinking usually ruins a party because some people get loud ar.d
boisterous.
B. Keeping the drinks full is the key to a good party.
31. A. The worst social sin is to be rude.
B. The worst social sin is to be a bore.
32. A. A person should have considerable sexual experience before marriage.
B. It's better if t~o married persons begin their sexual experience with
each other.
33. A. Even if I had the money I would not care to associate with flighty
rich persons like those in the "jet set".
B. I could conceive of myself seeking pleasures around the world with
the "jet set".
34. A. I like people who are sharp and witty even if they do sometimes
insult others.
B. I dislike people who have their fun at the expense of hurting the
feelings of others.
35. A. There is altogether too much portrayal of sex in movies.
B. I enjoy watching many of the "sexy" scenes in movies.
36. A. I feel best after taking a couple of drinks.
B. Something is wrona with people who need liquor to feel good.
37. A. People should dress according to some standard of taste, neatness,
and style.
B. People should dress in individual ways even if the effects are sometimes strange.
38. A. Sail ins lona distances in small sailing crafts is foolish.
B. I would like to sail a long distance in a small but seaworthy sailing
craft.
39. A. I have no patience with dull or boring persons.
B. I find something interesting in almost every person I talk to.
40. A. Skiing down a high mountain slope is a good way to end up on
crutches.
B. I think I would enjoy the sensations of skiing very fast down a high
mountain slope.
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SMAST
Please answer the following questions by circling yes or no.

1.

Do you feel you are a normal drinker? !By normal we mean you drink less
than or as much as most other people.) Yes No

2.

Does your wife, husband, a parent, or other near relative ever worry or
complain about your drinking? Yes No

3.

Do you ever feel guilty about your drinking?

4.

Do friends or relatives think you are a normal drinker?

5.

Are you able to stop drinking when you want to?

6.

Have you ever attended a meeting _of Alcoholics Anonymous?

7.

Has drinking ever created problems between you and your wife, husband,
a parent or other near relative? Yes No

8.

Have you ever gotten into trouble at work because of drinking?

9.

Have you ever neglected your obligations, your faailYt or your work for
two or more days in a row because you were drinkin1? Yes No

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

~o

No
Yes

10. Have you ever gone to anyone for help about your drinkin1?

Yes

11. Have you ever been in a hospital because of drinkin1?

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

No

12. Have you ever been arrested for drunken drivinl, drivinl while intoxicated, or driving under the influence of alcoholic bevera1ea?

Yes

13. Have you ever been arrested, even for a few hours, because of other
drunken behavior?

Yes

No

No
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BDI
On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read the entire group
of statements in each category. Then pick out the one statement in that
group which best describes the way you feel today, that is, right now! On
the answer sheet, circle the number corresponding to the statement you have
chosen. If several statements in the group seem to apply equally as well,
circle each one.
Be sure to read all of the statements in each group before making your
choice.
A.
0
2
3

I
I
I
I

do not feel sad
feel sad
am sad all the time and can't seem to snap out of it
am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

am not particularly discouraged about the future
feel discouraged about the future
feel I have nothing to look forward to
feel that the future is hopeless and that thin1s cannot improve

0
1
2
3

I do not feel like a failure
I feel I have failed more than .the avera1e person
As I look back on my life all I can see is a lot of failures
I feel I am a complete failure as a person

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

get as much satisfaction out of thin1s as I used to
don't enjoy thin1s the way I used to
don't get real satisfaction out of anythinl anymore
am dissatisfied or bored with everythinl

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

don't feel particularly 1uilty
feel guilty a good part of the time
feel quite 1uilty most of the time
feel 1uilty all of the time

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

don't feel I am beinl punished
feel I may be punished
expect to be punished
feel I am being punished

0

I don't feel disappointed in myself
I am disappointed with myself
I am dis1usted with myself

1

B.

c.

D.

E.

F.

G.
1

2
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3

I hate myself

0

I
I
I
I

don't feel I am any worse than anybody else
am critical of myself for my weaknesses or mistakes
blame myself all the time for my faults
blame myself for everything bad that happens

2
3

I
I
I
I

don't have any tho1ights of killing myself
have thoughts of killing myself, but would not carry them out
would like to kill myself
would kill myself if I had the chance

O
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

don't cry any more than usual
cry more now than I used to
cry all the time now
used to be able to cry, but now I can't cry even though I want to

0
1
2
3

I am no more irritated now than I ever am
I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to
I feel irritated all the time now

I don't get irritated at all by the things that used to irritate me

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

0
1
2

I make decisions about as well as I ever could
I put .off making decisions more than I used to
I have greater difficulty in making decisions than before
I can't make decisions at all any more

H.
1

2
3
I.

0
1

J,

K.

L.
have not lost interest in other people
am less interested in other people than I used to be
have lost most of my interest in other people
have lost all my interest in other people

M.

3

N.
0
1

2
3

I don't feel I look any worse than I used to
I am worried that I am looking old or unattractive
I feel that there are permanent changes in my appearance that make me
look unattractive
I believe that I look ugly

o.
0
1

2
3

I can work about as well as before
It takes extra effort to get started at doing something
I have to push myself very hard to do anything
I can't do any work at all

P.
0
1

I can sleep as well as usual
I don't sleep as well as I used to
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2
3

I wake up 1-2 hours earlier than usual and find it hard to get.back to
sleep
I wake up several hours earlier than I used to and cannot get back to
sleep

Q.
0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

don't get anymore tired than usual
get tired more easily than I used to
get tired from doing almost anything
am too tired to do anything

0
1
2
3

My appetite is not as good as it used to be
My appetite is much ~orse now

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

0
1

I am no more worried about my health than usual
I am worried about physical problems such as aches and pains, upaet
stomach, or constipation
I am very worried about physical problems and it's hard to think of
much else
I am so worried about my physical problems, I cannot think about
anything else

R.
~y

appetite is no worse than usual

I have no appetite at all any more

s.
haven't lost much weight, if any, lately
have lost more than 5 pounds
have lost more than 10 pounds
have lost more than 15 pounds

T.

2
3

u.

0
1
2
3

I
I
I
I

have not noticed any chanse in my interest in sex
am much less interested in sex than I used to be
am much less interested in sex now
have lost interest in sex completely

APPENDIX B
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FHI
We want you to consider some of the various health problems that could
happen to you at some time in the future. We want you to think about your
chances and how they compare with the chances of other men your age. ~e
don't want to know if you think it's likely or unlikely, but whether your
own risk seems greater than, less than, or about the same as other men's
risks. For each health problem, circle one number in the same row that
estimates your chances ccmpared to your peers.
Compared to other men your age. how likely are you to experience each of
these in the future?
much
slightly average slightly
much
below
belo~
below for men above above
above
average 3verage average my age average average
average
epilepsy

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

diabetes

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

hardenini of arteries

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

suicide attempt

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

liver disease

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

heart attack

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

lun1 cancer

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

ulcers

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

mi1raine headaches

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

asthma

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

fatal auto accident

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

kidney disease

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

stroke

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

strep throat

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

40 lbs. overweight

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

1um disease

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

Please 10 back and underline any of these health problems that you have
already experienced.

150

DAS
These questions are designed to assess your personal feelings about death
and dying. Read each statement and decide how you feel about the item. Then
indicate the strength of "our agreement or disagreement, using the scale
provided. Cnless otherwise indicated, consider the death in each question to
refer to your own death. Please try to answer each question.
Strong
Disagreement
1

~1oderate

Disagreement
2

Slight
Disagreement
3

Slight
Agreement

~oderate

Agreement
5

-!

Strong
Agreement
6

Rating
1-6

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

I would experience a great loss if someone close to me died.
I would never get over the death of someone close to me.
If someone close to me died, I ~ould miss him (or herl very much.
I could not accept the finality of the death of a friend.
I would easily adjust after the death of someone close to me.
I would not mind having to identify the corpse of someone I knew.
It would upset me to have to see someone who was dead.

Strong
Disa1reement
1

Somewhat
Disagreement
2

Somewhat
A1reement

Stron1
Agreement

3

4

Ratinl

1-4
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The pr9spect of my own death arouses anxiety in me.
The prospect of my own death depresses me.
I envision my own death as a painful, ni1htmarish experience.
I am afraid of dying.
I am afraid of beinl dead.
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AEQ-SELF
We would like to find out what you personally experience after you have had
a few alcoholic drinks.
For the following possible experiences, if an item
is always or sometimes true for you, circle true.
If the item is rarely or
never true for you, circle false.
Please answer every question without
skipping any.
1.

Alcohol makes me feel flushed.

2.

Alcohol decreases muscular

3.

I'm more clumsy after a

~.

True

False

True

False

True

False

I am more romantic when I drink.

True

False

5.

Drinking makes the future seem brighter to me.

True

False

6.

If I have had a couple of drinks it is easier for
me to tell someone off.

True

False

7.

I can't act as quickly when I've been drinkin1.

True

False

8.

Alcohol can act as an anesthetic for me, that is,
it can deaden pain.

True

False

I often feel sexier after I've had a few drinks.

True

False

10. Drinking makes me feel good.

True

False

11. Alcohol makes me careless about my actions.

True

False

True

False

13. Drinkinl increases my ag1ressiveness.

True

False

14. Alcohol seems like magic to me.

True

False

15. Alcohol makes it hard for me to concentrate.

True

False

16. I'm a better lover after a few drinks.

True

False

True

False

18. Drinking adds a certain warmth to social occasions
for me.

True

False

19. I can't think as quickly after I drink.

True

False

9.

tensi~n

fe~

in my body.

drinks.

12. Some alcohol has a pleasant, cleansin1, tinily
taste to me.

17. When I am drinking, it is easier to open up and
express my feelings.

20. Having a few drinks is a nice way for me to
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celebrate special occasions.

True

False

21. Alcohol makes me worry less.

True

False

22. Drinkinl makes me inefficient.

True

False

are enjoying themselves. True

False

23. Drinking is pleasurable because it's a way for me
~ho

to join in with people
24. After a few drinks,

st-xually responsive.

True

False

I drink.

True

False

True

False

True

false

28. Alcohol makes me less concerned about doing thin1s
well.

True

False

29. Alcohol helps me sleep better.

True

False

30. Drinkinl 1ives me more confidence in myself.

True

False

31. Alcohol makes me more irresponsible.

True

False

32. After a few drinks it is easier for me to pick
a fight.

True

False

33. A few drinks make it easier for me to talk to
people.

True

False

True

False

True

False

25. I feel more

I

am

coordinat~1

26. I'm more likely to sa•
drinking.

ffi•)l'P.

af~er

~mbara3stng

27. I enjoy having sex more if

r·~e

things after

had some alcohol.

34. If I have a couple of drinks it is easier to
express my feelings.
35. Alcohol makes me more interesting.

153

AEQ-OTHERS
We would like to find out what you think people in seneral experience after
they have had a few alcoholic drinks.
For the following possible
experiences, if an item is always or sometimes true, circle true.
If the
item is rarely or never true, circle false.
Please answer every question
~ithout skipping any.
1.

Drinking makes people feel flushed.

True

False

2.

Alcohol decreases muscular tension.

True

False

3.

People are more clumsy after a few drinks.

True

False

~.

People are more romantic when they drink.

True

False

5.

Drinking makes the future seem brighter.

True

False

6.

If someone has had a couple of drinks it is
easier for them to tell someone off,

True

False

People can't act as quickly when they've been
drinking.

True

False

Alcohol can act as an anesthetic, that is, it
can deaden pain.

True

False

People often feel sexier after they've had a
few drinks.

True

False

10. Drinking makes people feel good.

True

False

11. Alcohol makes people careless about their actions.

True

False

12. Some alcohol has a pleasant, cleansing, tingly
taste.

True

False

13. Drinking increases aggressiveness.

True

Faise

14. Alcohol seems like magic.

True

False

15. Alcohol makes it hard to concentrate.

True

False

16. People are better lovers after a few drinks.

True

False

17. When people are drinking, it is easier for them
to open up and express feelings.

True

False

18. Drinking adds a certain warmth to social occasions. True

False

True

False

7.
8.
9.

19. People can't think as quickly after they drink.
20. Having a few drinks is a nice way for people to
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celebrate special occasions.

True

False

21. Alcohol makes people worry less.

True

False

22. Drinking makes one inefficient.

True

False

23. Drinking is pleasurable because it's a wa) to
join in with people ~he tr~ enjoying themselves.

True

False

True

False

True

False

True

False

27. People enjoy having sex more 1f they've had some
alcohol.

True

False

28. Alcohol makes one less concerned about doing
thinss right.

True

False

29. Alcohol helps people sleep better.

True

False

30. Drinkins sives people more confidence in themselves.True

False

31. Alcohol makes one more irresponsible.

True

False

32. After a few drinks it is easier to pick a fight.

True

False

33. A few drinks make it easier to talk to people.

True

False

34. If people have a couple of drinks it is easier
to express their feelings,

True

False

35. Alcohol makes people more interesting.

True

False

24. After a few drinks,
responsive.
25. People feel more

P"'<)f:L~

are more

coorJ~n~ted

26. People are more likely
after drinking.

aft~r

sexual!~·

they drink.

,, say ,;>mbarassing things
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PILOT STUDY

The Future Health Inventory (FHI) and the short form
of the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (AEQ) were developed
and validated in a pilot study with fifty-six volunteer subjects from the V.A. hospital domiciliary.

The Human Sub-

jects Review Committee of the V.A. Medical Center raised a
question as to the subjects' ability to manage the formats
and the length of the proposed measures.

In response, a

pilot study was developed to assess the clarity of the
instructions of the Future Health Inventory and to see which
of two measures, the Subjective Probability Questionnaire
(Lewinsohn et al., 1982) or the Alcohol Effects Questionnaire (Brown et al., 1980; Rohsenow, 1983), was more amenable to a short form version.
All subjects were males between the ages of 19 and 67,
with a mean age of 44 and no history of significant psychiatric disorder.

Seventy-seven percent of the sample had a

history of treatment for alcohol abuse.

The subjects repre-

sented the lower to middle range of socioeconomic status
within the V.A.

popu~ation,

with an annual average income of

less than 10,000 dollars and an average level of education
of thirteen years.

There were no significant differences

between groups in term of age, race, marital status, educa-
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tion, or degree of life change in the last year.

The only

significant difference between alcoholic and nonalcoholic
subjects was that alcohol abuse was associated with unemployment (Q<.01).

The fifty-six subjects in the pilot study

received these three measures along with the demographic
questionnaire, and 66% completed the forms again after a two
week interval.
The pilot subjects showed no difficulty with the format or instructions of the FHI.

There were no questions

asked during the administration of the measure and a very
low incidence of incomplete data, i.e. 6%.

All item means

were negative, indicating consistent expectations of lessthan-average personal health risk.

Alcoholic subjects

endorsed higher rates of experience with suicide attempts,
ulcers, migraine headaches, and being overweight, but surprisingly the group means of different items were not particularly affected by actual experience with the health
problem.

Subjects' appraisals of personal risk were closer

to their views of risk for their peers at the time of
retesting, with an average test-retest correlation for combined samples of

~=.58

(range .41 to .73).

These data sug-

gested that the FHI was a feasible instrument for use in
this study.
Both Lewinsohn et al.'s (1982) Subjective Probability
Questionnaire (SPQ) and Rohsenow's (1983) Alcohol Effects
Questionnaire (AEQ) were considered as measures of differen-
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tial expectations for oneself and for others.

Adequate val-

idity and reliabilty coefficients have previously been
reported for both measures (Lewinsohn et al., 1982; Rohsenow, 1983; Rohsenow & Bacharowski, 1984).

However, each was

validated on different populations-- depressed community
volunteers and alcohol abusers, respectively.

The SPQ con-

sists of eight scales of ten items each, representing the
positive and negative dichotomies of self and world, and
present and future.

Subjects are asked to assign a proba-

bility rating, in intervals of ten, for the truth or likelihood of each statement, e.g. the likelihood (in %) of the
statement "I am destined to suffer'' being true.

Reported

mean scale correlations range from .59 to .70 after a two
month interval (Munoz & Lewinsohn, unpublished manuscript).
The AEQ measures beliefs about alcohol's effects:
forty self-referent and forty other-referent statements are
rated by subjects as true or false based on their own experience.

The items load onto eight expectancy scales, for

which Rohsenow (1983) reports internal consistency ratings
(using Cronbach's alpha) ranging from .49 to .74.

Six of

the subscales relate to expectations of positive consequences of drinking; two subscales measure expectations of negative consequences.

The AEQ showed some advantage over the

SPQ in its simpler format and its focus on expectations of
reinforcement from alcohol.
to that of the SPQ.

However, its length was similar

Thus the responses of the subjects in
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the pilot study were examined in terms of their item-scale
correlations, to see if the number of items could be reduced
while maintaining comparable reliability and validity.
The results of the pilot study showed support for the
use of the AEQ, rather than the SPQ, for the proposed study.
The original subscales of each measure were examined for
alcoholic(~=
(~=

56).

43),

nonalcoholic(~=

13), and combined groups

An a priori decision was made to keep a minimum of

four items per scale, in order to assure a sufficient degree
of variability in scale scores to discriminate among the
subject groups.

Several analyses were employed to compare

the psychometric properties of the AEQ and the SPQ and to
construct shortened revisions of each measure.
First, item-whole correlations were computed and
examined for each subscale.

Item analyses indicated that

there were more poorer items on the SPQ than the AEQ, i.e.
item-scale correlations ranged from
former, versus a range of

~=

~=

.20 to .86 for the

.38 to .86 for the latter.

Items with the lowest item-whole correlations were eliminated, and the correlations were re-computed to see how the
elimination of items affected the internal consistency of
the subscale.

On this basis, four items were dropped from

the original AEQ subscales and four from the SPQ subscales
while maintaining comparable or stronger item-scale correlations.

Because the AEQ consists of two alternate forms of

the same forty items, differing only in self-other refer-

160
ence, there was a more substantial reduction of overall
items from 80 to 72.

Also, the subjects showed substan-

tially more difficulty with the format of the SPQ and ieft
more incomplete answers on that measure.

Thus the results

of the analyses, plus the considerations of content relevancy, format, and length, supported the use of the revised
AEQ rather than the SPQ.
Two additional analyses were run on the AEQ pilot data
to determine whether any further reduction in the number of
items was possible.

Simultaneous multiple correlations were

used to examine the unique contribution of each item to the
variance in the scale score.

Part-whole correlations were

also run to calculate the correlation between each item and
a modified scale score computed without the variance of that
particular item.

With so few items in each scale, the part-

whole analyses were employed to identify spurious correlations, in which items are significantly correlated to the
total scale score but are unrelated to the other items in
the scale (Cohen & Cohen, 1975).
On the bases of these analyses, one more item was
dropped, reducing the total number of items in the AEQ to
70: internal consistency reliability coefficients for the
eight subscales range

from~=

.38 to .86 (tl= .69).

Average

test-retest correlations for the "self" and "other" forms of
the AEQ are, respectively, K= .73 (range of .58 to .83) and
K=

.64 (range of .41 to .73).

Intercorrelations for the
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eight subscales range from -.16 to .54 for the ''self" version and from -.20 to .54 for the ''other" version of the
measure, Tables 6-10 summarize the data from these analyses.
A problem was noted with the Power subscale, in that
it showed relatively weaker internal consistency and testretest reliability coefficients than did the other scales, a
finding also reported by Brown et al.
Goldman, and Christianson (1985).

(1981) and Brown,

However, Rohsenow (1983)

reported satisfactory internal consistency for the scale,
and it has shown some discriminant validity for heavier
drinking patterns (Rohsenow, 1983; Rohsenow & Bachorowski,
1984; Brown, 1985b).

These findings suggest enough evidence

of the scale's value to retain it for the purposes of the
present study.
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TABLE 6: Average Item-Whole Correlations
of the Original and Revised AEQ Subscales

Original

Revised

Global-Self

.69

.74

Global-Other

.63

.69

Power-Self

.61

.69

Power-Other

.53

.63

Social-Self

.65

.72

Social-Other

.60

.70

Relax-Self

.63

.63

Relax-Other

.64

.65
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TABLE 7: AEQ-Self Interscale Correlations

Careless
1

Impair- Pleasure Global Power
Positive
ment
2

3

4

5

Social

Sexual

Relax

6

7

8

2

.50

3

.01

-.08

4

.09

-.16

.54

5

.46

.17

.12

.32

6

.16

.oo

.41

.45

.38

7

-.01

-.03

.56

.54

.20

.44

8

.25

.13

.59

.47

.16

.54

.36
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TABLE 8: AEQ-Other Interscale Correlations

Careless

1

Impair- Pleasure Global Power
ment
Positive
2

3

4

5

Social

Sexual

Relax

6

7

8

2

.54

3

-.12

-.08

4

.06

-.07

.40

5

-.03

-.02

.06

.04

6

-.04

-.13

.37

.51

-.10

7

-.20

-.20

.47

.63

.12

.36

8

.21

.22

.52

.39

-.10

.40

.30
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TABLE 9: Original and Revised AEQ
Subscale Correlations

Self

Other

Global Positive

.96

.97

Power

.93

.75

Social

.96

.98

Relaxation

.96

.96

166

TABLE 10: Revised AEQ Subscale Test-Retest
Reliability Coefficients

Self

Other

Carelessness

• 71

.90

Global Positive

.77

.68

Impairment

•71

.84

Pleasure

.83

.79

Power

.58

.05

Relaxation

.73

.54

Sexual

.75

.70

Social

.62

.74
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TEST OF SELF-OTHER DIFFERENCES

A problem arose in testing the significance of the
difference in self-other scores, and whether groups varied
significantly in the degree of the self-other differences.
A mixed design ANOVA testing within subjects (self-other)
and between subjects (three groups) was not sufficient,
because a simple comparison of unadjusted "self" and "other''
scores would have been impossible to interpret for several
reasons.

First of all, the variables of social desirabil-

ity, sensation seeking, and life stress were significantly
confounded almost exclusively with the self-referent measures.

Also, group means of these confounding variables

varied significantly, so between group comparisons were
problemmatic as well.

One possible solution was to run

another multiple regression correlation, partialling the
effects of these three variables on a single difference
score for each measure.

While fairly straightforward con-

ceptually, this is not a recommended method of analysis for
statistical reasons.

The main argument against using a dif-

ference score in a multiple regression equation is that it
overcorrects, because it assumes a high correlation between
the two scales (Cohen & Cohen, 1975; Chronbach, 1970).
Also, the reliability of difference scores is often low, as
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it depends on the reliability of each measure as well as the
strength of the measures' correlation (Cohen & Cohen, 1975).
The preferred method of analysis, adopted for this
study, was to partial the variance of the self-referent
measure from the variance of the other-referent measure and
then test the significance of their difference, both within
and between subjects (Cohen & Cohen, 1975).

That is, the

"other" scores were treated as the dependent variable,
tested in the second stage of the analysis after partialling
for effects of social desirability, sensation seeking, life
stress, and "self" scores.

The coding for group membership

was also included in the second stage, allowing a betweengroups test of the self-other differences.
Because social desirability effects were associated
with minimalization of personal vulnerability, unadjusted
self-other difference scores would have been exaggerated,
especially for the hypertension group, who had significantly
higher social desirability scores.

By using a partialling

procedure, the test was more conservative, supporting the
validity of the significant differences found for all of the
AEQ self-other comparisons.

Similarly, without partialling

the effects of sensation seeking and life stress, spurious
group differences in self-other evaluations might have
resulted because the hypertension group significantly differed from the alcoholic groups on these two measures.

When

these were taken into account, there was only one signifi-
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cant group difference in degree of self-other discrepency,
between the outpatient and hypertension groups for alcoholrelated impairment.
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